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ABSTRACT 
 
The Role of Debt and Dependency in Shaping West Virginia’s Political Economy, 1820-1920 
 
Chad R. Holmes 
 
This thesis evaluates how West Virginia’s perceptions of debt and dependency were formed 
and contributed to the state’s political economy throughout the nineteenth century. As a part of the 
Virginia Commonwealth, western Virginians used antebellum political debates to independently 
control regional resources and seize the political prestige of connecting the nation’s east to the 
nation’s west. When eastern Virginians seceded from the Union in 1861, western Virginians saw an 
opportunity to claim their independence. Secessionist and unionist support provided the political 
chaos necessary for western Virginians to declare their independence.  Political uprisings sprouted up 
throughout western Virginia. Northwestern Virginia’s pro-Union leaders vowed to support northern 
efforts. The addition of western Virginia to the Union provided President Lincoln with an important 
war measure to weaken the Commonwealth and contribute to a pressing demand for troops and 
resources. However, before western Virginians could seize their independence, they were asked to 
reconcile a debt. Virginia’s antebellum investments, which western Virginia supported to varying 
degrees, generated an unresolved public debt of over $30 million at the start of the Civil War. Prior to 
and after achieving statehood, western Virginians engaged in political debates over the public debt 
and how it should be addressed. 
 Perceptions of debt were both deeply political in the nineteenth century and contributed to the 
formation of West Virginia’s political economy. West Virginians engaged in debates over investment 
and capital that collided with concerns over lost reputation and dependence. This thesis is organized 
into three chapters that evaluate how public debt emerged as a central factor that influenced political 
perspectives in West Virginia from 1820 to 1920.  Antebellum political debates over banking 
policies, internal improvements and the justice system shaped western perceptions over public 
investment and financial obligations. During the Civil War and the march towards statehood, West 
Virginians shifted their processes for accumulating, acknowledging, and reconciling debt issues. 
West Virginia shifted its dependent relationship to the federal government and northern investors 
interested in a Union victory. Postbellum debates over resolving antebellum and wartime debts led to 
a prolonged dispute among the former Commonwealth factions and debates over how the 
outstanding debt should be resolved. The dispute was finally resolved through the intervention of the 
United States Supreme Court in the early twentieth century.  West Virginia’s failed legal arguments 
reaffirmed a political inferiority that provided a foundation for the state’s postcolonial political 
economy throughout the nineteenth century and reflected the state’s inherent dependence on other 
political bodies.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction: An Activated Citizenry ............................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 1: Don’t Run Into Debt: Antebellum Debates over Public Investments and the 
Development of Virginia’s Public Debt ................................................................................ 8 
Chapter 2 : Who Is to Be Bound for This Debt?: Resolving Issues of Debt during the Civil War 
and Reconstruction Era ........................................................................................................ 30 
Chapter 3: Make No Deep Scrutiny Into Her Mutiny: The Supreme Court’s Rulings in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. The State of West Virginia ................................................... 50 
Conclusion: A Fair and Equitable Proportion ............................................................................... 73 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 77 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction: An Activated Citizenry 
   
 This thesis evaluates how West Virginia’s perceptions of debt and dependency were formed 
and contributed to the state’s political economy throughout the nineteenth century. As a part of the 
Virginia Commonwealth, western Virginians used antebellum political debates to independently 
control regional resources and seize the political prestige of connecting the nation’s east to the 
nation’s west. When eastern Virginians seceded from the Union in 1861, western Virginians saw an 
opportunity to claim their independence. Secessionist and unionist support provided the political 
chaos necessary for western Virginians to declare their independence.  Political uprisings sprouted up 
throughout western Virginia. Northwestern Virginia’s pro-Union leaders vowed to support northern 
efforts. The addition of western Virginia to the Union provided President Lincoln with an important 
war measure to weaken the Commonwealth and contribute to a pressing demand for troops and 
resources. However, before western Virginians could seize their independence, they were asked to 
reconcile a debt. Virginia’s antebellum investments, which western Virginia supported to varying 
degrees, generated an unresolved public debt of over $30 million at the start of the Civil War. Prior to 
and after achieving statehood, western Virginians engaged in political debates over the public debt 
and how it should be addressed. 
 Perceptions of debt were both deeply political in the nineteenth century and contributed to the 
formation of West Virginia’s political economy. West Virginians engaged in debates over investment 
and capital that collided with concerns over lost reputation and dependence. This thesis is organized 
into three chapters to evaluate how public debt emerged as a central factor that influenced political 
perspectives in West Virginia  from 1820 to 1920.  Chapter One evaluates how debt perspectives 
shaped debates over banking policies, internal improvements and the justice system. State 
constitutional conventions, regional newspapers, and county lawsuits reflect disputes over western 
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Virginian political and economic reforms. Chapter Two evaluates West Virginia’s processes for 
accumulating, acknowledging, and reconciling debt issues during the Civil War era. The 
development of a proxy eastern Virginia government, i.e. the “Restored State of Virginia”, executed 
questionable interstate agreements over debt agreements and political reforms that led to the creation 
of West Virginia. These agreements created a precarious scenario for West Virginia in which the 
debts and statehood became contingent on the outcome of the war itself.  West Virginia shifted its 
dependent relationship to the federal government and northern investors interested in a successful 
Union victory. Speeches, constitutional conventions, and congressional testimony depict the irony of 
West Virginia becoming independent from Virginia and in the process becoming dependent on the 
federal government.  Chapter Three addresses the competing political positions used during the 
resolution of the debt controversy through the Supreme Court. This chapter reviews Virginia’s 
legislative reforms and debt commission actions that led to the Commonwealth’s 1906 Supreme 
Court filing. The Supreme Court’s decision represented a mandate on West Virginia’s rights to 
manage and administer a political economy with the intervention of another political body. West 
Virginia’s loss in the Supreme Court case reaffirmed a political inferiority that provided a foundation 
for West Virginia’s postcolonial political economy throughout the nineteenth century and reflected 
the state’s inherent dependence on others to drive its political economy.    
Focusing on the political nature of debt contributes to the existing historiography of the 
United States’ nineteenth-century political economy. Western Virginians formulated their political 
identities and shaped their political economy through debates over debt and dependency. Recent 
historiography of Virginia’s antebellum political economy focuses on economic modernization. In 
his 2013 dissertation, George Gilliam argued that Virginia’s public institutions became essential to 
rebuilding a postbellum economy gradually throughout the nineteenth century. Gilliam contends that 
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“The process by which Virginians rebuilt their public and private institutions, renewed and 
strengthened ties with the national economy, and reconstructed the Old Dominion's political and 
economic infrastructure, was a gradual one, pushed and pulled by forces that were evident in the state 
decades before the Civil War.”1 Gilliam focused on the adaptability of Virginia’s political, economic, 
and judicial institutions. However, he fails to acknowledge how regionally defined perceptions of 
debt and dependency shaped eastern and western Virginia’s sectional crises that led to western 
secession during the Civil War.   
The recent historiography of nineteenth-century debt and dependency addressed the 
sociopolitical perceptions of financial failure, availability of capital and credit in encouraging 
excessive consumption, and the role that race played in shaping perceptions of debt. Historians Bruce 
Mann and David Silkenat evaluated how debt and dependency emerged as key byproducts of the 
economy. Mann asserts that Americans adopted a commercial culture rife with financial speculation, 
leading to increased levels of personal indebtedness and insolvency during the Early Republic. 
Americans actively used credit to invest in new and unpredictable economic markets, which created 
the potential for economic success and failure.2 By contrast, Silkenat depicts how white and black 
North Carolinians held considerably different opinions of bankruptcy protection, the use of credit, 
and secondary market economies (such as pawnshops and boardinghouses).3 These differences 
substantiated Silkenat’s overall evaluation of black and white North Carolinians’ reactions to being 
in debt. Mann’s and Silkenat’s work contribute to our understanding of the impact of indebtedness on 
the political and social spheres of the American political economy during the nineteenth century.  
                     
1 George Harrison Gilliam, “Building a Modern South: Political Economy in Nineteenth Century Virginia”  
(Doctoral Dissertation) University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 2013, (No. AAT 3570386), Abstract, ii. 
2 Bruce H. Mann, Republic of Debtors: Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002). 
3 David Silkenat, Moments of Despair: Suicide, Divorce, and Debt in Civil War Era North Carolina (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 
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Focusing more specifically on the integration of economic failure into society, historians 
Edward Balleisen and Scott Sandage addressed how Americans adapted to bankruptcy as a 
byproduct of the nation’s industrialization and commercial growth. Balleisen argued that the 
Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1841 reflected a shift in how the national legislature viewed financial 
failure. Congress recognized the importance of voluntary bankruptcy in administering issues of 
indebtedness. Individual insolvency emerged as a nationwide issue that touched on all aspects of 
American society, including the political system.4  Similarly, Sandage focused on the role of 
insolvency and financial failure in shaping identities throughout the nineteenth century. Sandage 
asserts that “Besides marking particular reversals of fortune, [Americans] perceived that failure 
measured a man’s ambition and approach to life. In a culture defined by ‘the tug of business,’ failure 
was no longer just an affliction; it was fast becoming an identity.”5  The analysis presented in this 
thesis complements this historiographical analysis by linking cultural and political perspectives of 
debt to the formulation of the broader political economy. Public debt emerged as a means of shared 
commitment and oppressive control throughout the century. Acknowledging and refuting public debt 
became a matter of honor and reputation that pitted Virginia and West Virginia against one another 
for over a century and shaped the controversy after the Civil War ended.   
 Debt emerged as a central theme in the nation’s political economy because of the rise in 
financial exchanges that challenged the balances of power. The advent of capital-generating policies 
and institutions fueled changes in how Americans generated financial commitments. Private credit 
agreements, public taxes, and long-term investments through public bonds created conflicts over 
perceptions of power dynamics. Americans confronted questions over public accountability and 
                     
4 Edward Balleisen, Navigating Failure: Bankruptcy and Commercial Society in Antebellum America. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 167. 
5 Scott Sandage, Born Losers: A History of Failure in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 16. 
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redemption for poorly fabricated investments. These dynamics became critical when placed in the 
context of the nation’s debates over secession and emancipation. This volatile political economy also 
redefined the nature of public investment and debt. Understanding debt and dependence as a matter 
of political positioning is necessary in order to understand why West Virginians sought financial 
control from the Commonwealth’s Richmond leadership, agreed to pay a portion of Virginia’s public 
debt, and challenged federal authorities who demanded a debt resolution.  Regional communities 
striving for public stability struggled to manage debts stemming from local needs (such as the 
administration of justice) with state needs (such as financing of internal improvements). These 
demands placed West Virginia’s priorities at odds with broader macroeconomic priorities.  
Prior to the Civil War, western Virginians’ perspectives about debt conflicted with 
easterners’ perspectives because the latter centered on consolidation of the Commonwealth’s 
resources. Easterners controlled the state’s political processes and only reluctantly acknowledged 
westerners as equals during the frequent political debates. Consequently, statewide reforms, when 
imposed at the local level, generated questions over government intervention in both creating and 
participating in lawsuits in issues of indebtedness that pitted eastern and western interests against 
each other. Economist Robert Kuttner’s Debtor’s Prison provides an important clarification to the 
potential risk. Kuttner argues, “In a capitalist society with extremes of inequality, it is only natural 
that owners or manipulators of vast pools of capital should [wield] political power. In a democracy, 
an activated citizenry can contest that dominance and channel finance to a role more conducive to 
broad prosperity… .”6  The political nature of debt is generated through disputes over the control of 
capital and the role of public institutions in managing and resolving debt feuds. Americans incurred 
debt through tax increases, internal improvement investments, and military deployments, which led 
                     
6 Robert Kuttner, Debtors’ Prison: The Politics of Austerity Versus Possibility (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 
11. 
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to political disputes over power dynamics between competing political entities at the county, state, 
and national levels.  
West Virginia’s failed efforts to create political equality and separation reflected changes 
in the state’s political economy throughout the nineteenth century. An underlying concern over 
political and economic inferiority was embedded in western Virginia during the antebellum 
period. Westerners fought perceptions that the region provided colonial resource support for the 
Commonwealth’s eastern-led slave economy. The Civil War temporarily provided the new state 
of West Virginia with an opportunity to establish political, economic, and cultural independence. 
After decades of clashing with eastern Virginians over capital, investments, and justice, West 
Virginia sought a political economy based on the fair distribution of capital and political 
authority. West Virginia’s willingness to pay a “fair and equitable proportion” of another state’s 
debt was a political expression of sovereign control. However, independence and control were 
temporary. Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, West Virginia’s political 
economy reflected a transferal of dependence from Virginia to the United States government that 
reflected a continuation of the region’s perception of providing only colonial support. West 
Virginia maintained a postcolonial political economy that held the new state in a “lingering 
colonial dependence—and a corresponding sense of inferiority” and a continued political 
interference by the federal government.7  West Virginians, struggling to become independent 
from Virginia, were unable to define their political identity as an independent state.  
                     
7 Kariann Akemi Yokota, Unbecoming British: How Revolutionary America Became a Postcolonial Nation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 11. I am adopting Yokota’s argument—that Revolutionary America’s  incomplete 
efforts to create a separate and distinct political culture resulted in the persistence of a dependent political economy 
struggling for a distinct identity—as a means of examining how West Virginia created and struggled with the 
changing political and economic realities of the nineteenth century.  
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Understanding how West Virginia’s political economy transitioned from a position of “fair and 
equitable proportionality” to a position of “postcolonial dependence” is the focus of this thesis.  
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Chapter 1: Don’t Run Into Debt: Antebellum Debates over Public 
Investments and the Development of Virginia’s Public Debt 
 
During the forty years leading up to the Civil War, Congress debated strategies such as 
forming the Bank of the United States, creating a national infrastructure of public works expanding 
slavery to new states, and implementing a coherent internal improvement system in order to build a 
stronger political economy. Within Virginia, political representatives in the western part of the state 
politically positioned their region as the economic bridge linking the nation’s east with the west. 
Their hopes of developing and maintaining commercial connectivity to both eastern Virginians and 
the greater Ohio River Valley shaped westerners’ political policies. Their perspectives 
on indebtedness significantly influenced the way citizens of western Virginia thought about political 
economy during the antebellum era. For instance, a Harrison County, Virginia newspaper, Cooper’s 
Clarksburg Register, published the poem “Don’t Run in Debt” in a March 1852 edition. In support of 
the hard currency debate that unfolded after private bank failures of the 1840s, the poem proposed, 
“Good friends, let me beg you, don’t run in debt / If the chairs and sofas are old / They will fit your 
backs better than any new set / Unless they are paid for—with gold.”8 In short, the poem highlighted 
an existing dichotomy in the western Virginia economy: too much debt should be avoided unless it 
was debt that was properly financed. Understanding indebtedness provides a clearer insight into how 
Americans understood and responded to both local and national commitments generated by the 
rapidly changing political environment. Debt defined political commitments and influenced power 
shifts between local authorities, internal and external commercial interests, and federal power in the 
nineteenth century. 
                     
8 “Don’t Run In Debt”, Cooper’s Clarksburg Register, Clarksburg, Virginia, March 10, 1852. 
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Western Virginia’s perceptions of debt were deeply politicized and reflected emerging 
national debates during the antebellum era about financial obligations and commitments. Three 
factors shaped regional perceptions of debt. First, statewide banking reforms created regional 
tensions. Bankers and the bank-chartering processes exerted power over the way capital was 
distributed. Western Virginians’ efforts to maintain regional industrial banks clashed with eastern 
Virginians’ promotion of branch banking systems that allocated bank charters to regions based on 
political loyalties.  Second, infrastructure development influenced community obligations and 
responsibilities. State spending priorities conflicted with regional priorities over where and how 
internal improvement programs should be deployed. The third factor, county courts and debt 
collection efforts, provided a public place for issues of debt to be settled among a wide array of 
debtors and creditors. Federal, state, and local plaintiffs filed suit against western Virginians and in 
the process, altered perceptions of financial commitments and indebtedness. Accepting and 
acknowledging certain forms of indebtedness—while rejecting other forms—became the price that 
western Virginians paid for their political identity and cohesiveness. These factors reflected the 
nation’s emerging debates over dependency, financial failure, and public intervention that erupted 
during the Civil War.   
 Prior to 1863, western Virginia was the Old Dominion’s gateway to the west, a place shaped 
by easterners’ commercial ambitions and westerners’ concerns of being politically underrepresented. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, Virginia’s leaders remained committed to linking eastern markets 
in Richmond to western resources through a cohesive transportation network of railroads and canals 
running to Wheeling and Parkersburg. Aspirations of equaling other states’ success stories, such as 
New York’s Erie Canal, were beset by political frustrations and financial failures. Political concerns 
about overburdening eastern plantation owners with increased taxes led Virginia’s leadership to rely 
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more heavily on public bonds to finance a fragmented internal improvement plan. A deep political 
sectionalism emerged between eastern and western Virginians that created polemic debates over 
taxation, political representation, and internal improvement projects. Debt underlined these disputes. 
Western Virginians framed their political environment in terms of autonomy, self-reliance, and 
commercialization. Westerners in Brooke, Ohio, and Monongalia counties worried that accumulating 
commercial and public debt for investments that principally benefited easterners, such as the state-
backed Virginia Central Railroad, would lead to their political subordination and dependence.  
Economic control and political influence over western resources emerged as a key debate in 
the antebellum period. In 1820, the western economy exhibited signs of the nation’s ever-changing 
social, political, and economic structures: transportation expansion, westward migration, and a 
growing reliance on banking to fund future growth. Ohio County, western Virginia’s largest region, 
grew in population from 4,700 residents in 1800 to over 18,000 by 1850.9 The city of Wheeling, both 
the regional commercial hub and the county seat for Ohio County, grew to be the 51st largest town in 
the United States by 1840.10 Investors flocked to the region in hopes of profiting from the rapid 
commercial growth driven by the salt, iron, and glass industries in Ohio County. Growing disparities 
in population and industrial growth led many Virginians to assess the role westerners should have in 
driving the state’s—and possibly, the nation’s—political capabilities.  
Through the constitutional convention of the 1820s, political leadership engaged in debates 
over key democratic reforms and rights.  Eastern Virginians prioritized political stability and 
hereditary property rights as being central in their debates over political representation and public 
responsibilities. Richmond representative, Philip Nicholas, argued for political representation to be 
                     
9 University of Virginia Geospatial and Statistical Data Center, Historical Census Browser, (accessed November 8, 
2015), http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu. 
10 United Status Bureau of the Census, Table 7: Population of the 100 Largest Cities: 1840, (accessed November 8, 
2015), www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab07.txt. 
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linked to community commitment, which could be developed through a “lasting ownership of the 
soil of the country.”11 Western reliance upon credit and temporary land ownership threatened the 
political balance of Virginia. Historian Christopher Curtis argued that this political tension emerged 
from the “reconceptualization of republic political ideals [based on] a more democratic belief that 
diverse forms of property ownership also possessed political value… .”12 Eastern Virginians 
associated the ownership of real property and wealth with a person’s ability to govern and rule. These 
perspectives clashed with westerners reliant upon credit to acquire land for short-term use. Lower- 
and middle-class westerners complicated representation debates through the acquisition of property 
with credit. Tenant farming and freeholding arrangements clashed with more traditional rights of 
slaveholding and agricultural plantations that easterners cited as necessary for political 
involvement.13 
 Through the convention, westerners attempted to combine the region’s growing populations 
and diverse forms of property to gain greater political control. Brooke County representative, Phillip 
Doddridge, proposed a constitutional amendment changing how legislative representation could be 
assessed. Doddridge proposed a ten-year census to determine district representation levels throughout 
the state.14 Politically, easterners viewed the amendment as a challenge to the shared principles of 
Virginia’s political economy. Charlotte County’s John Randolph objected to the amendment and 
chastised the west for destabilizing Virginia’s political framework: “Sir, I see no wisdom in making 
the provision for future changes. You must give Governments time to operate on the people, and give 
people time to become gradually assimilated to their institutions. Almost anything is better than this 
                     
11 Virginia Constitutional Convention, Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830, 
(New York: De Capo Press, 1971), 364. 
12 Christopher M. Curtis, “Reconsidering Suffrage Reform in the 1829-1830 Virginia Constitutional Convention,” 
Journal of Southern History 74, no. 1 (February 2008): 90. 
13 Curtis, “Reconsidering Suffrage”, 93. 
14 Virginia Constitutional Convention, Proceedings and Debates, 485. 
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state of perpetual uncertainty.”15  A western willingness to incur debt to acquire the requisite land, 
resources, and political control daunted eastern leadership. Randolph concluded, “The period has 
arrived of living by one’s wits—of living by contracting debts that one cannot pay—and above all, of 
living by office hunting. Bankrupts—branded bankrupts giving great dinners—sending their children 
to the most expensive schools—giving grand parties—and just as well received as anybody in 
society.” 16 Statewide political control—established through generational distributions of wealth and 
property—was threatened by a western willingness to gain property and social status through credit 
required to take part in the political processes. Debt provided westerners with a political instrument 
to gain greater influence and power. The growth of public sector institutions, such as county courts 
and banks, paralleled the growth in population and commercial sector. While western Virginians 
developed a persuasive case for both political and commercial autonomy from the rest of the 
Commonwealth, the infusion of state institutions undermined this independence.   
 State and regional political interests collided through the advancement of differing 
Commonwealth banking practices. The collateral used to support credit extensions provided the 
public with differing means for trading assets for credit: land banks accepted real estate, commercial 
banks accepted specie.17  Antebellum banks created, utilized, and administered networks of capital-
generating and credit-needy individuals interested in shaping a community based on their shared 
perspective. The bank chartering processes promoted the public’s interests through political 
approaches that placed banks in regions where the banks could prosper and politicians could gain 
public recognition. The commercial objectives of regional bank promoters and state legislatures 
                     
15 Virginia Constitutional Convention, Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830 : To 
Which Are Subjoined the New Constitution of Virginia, and the Votes of the People (Richmond: Samuel Shepard and 
Company, 1830), 790. 
16 Virginia Constitutional Convention, Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia State Convention, 790-791. 
17 Brian Phillips Murphy, Building The Empire State: Political Economy in the Early Republic (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), ix-x. 
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converged through the chartering process that granted charters for the establishment of local banks. 
As a result, “Banks, as organizations, were believed to harbor and act on the party sympathies of both 
their promoters and the legislative majority at the time the charter act was passed.”18 Unlike local 
banks that leveraged the regional economy both to thrive and develop, state banks leveraged the 
political processes of the legislature and economic leadership to drive capital to areas where 
legislative objectives could be enhanced with state capital.  
The Commonwealth’s increased reliance on state-owned banks and chartering processes both 
restrained western Virginians from developing their own financial obligations and shifted financial 
responsibility to eastern state authorities. Banking reflected the rapid merger of finance, politics, and 
power critical to the growth of the American West. Brian Murphy argues that banks reflected the 
perfect combination for the “economically and politically ambitious” proprietors interested in 
obtaining political and commercial success. Bankers maintained political influence through networks 
and commercial loyalties, including state governments. Murphy contends that “The act of granting 
and tapering access to the credit while excluding others … is what gives bankers their power. Banks 
therefore shape their clients’ interests, and if a bank is a lender to local or state governments, its 
directors calibrate the interests of those public entities as well.”19 The convergence of public 
institutions and banking formed political links between state interventions and financial 
commitments.  
The chartering of the Bank of Virginia in 1804 established a consolidation of the state’s 
financial resources in Richmond and led to the convergence of banking and politics within the state. 
State leadership maintained several avenues for influencing bank operations. State leadership 
appointed all members on a ten-person Board of Directors and the State Treasurer influenced the 
                     
18 Howard Bodenhorn, State Banking in the Early Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 13. 
19 Murphy, Building the Empire State, 23-24. 
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management of the Bank by holding a deciding vote on electing the Bank’s Board of Directors. 
These processes favored eastern control over the Bank of Virginia’s actions and policies. Annual 
stock investments, funded through a combination of low-interest bank loans and taxes, allowed state 
leadership to create a strong political partnership with the Bank. Commerce expert George Starnes 
argued that the Bank’s “complete monopoly, granted by the state and in which the state has an 
interest, is prone to feel that it can do as much as it pleases.” 20 This control enabled eastern 
leadership to guide and restrict where banks could be established and how credit could be infused 
into a local economy. While the Commonwealth’s leadership sought to develop banks in the western 
region, ownership of the bank’s capital remained in eastern control.  
Prior to 1818, westerners relied upon private banks to finance key projects and growth areas. 
Private banks evolved in tandem with the growth of salt, iron, and glass industries. These local 
private banks raised concerns that the wealth of the state would be diluted by these smaller 
enterprises. Virginia’s legislature, determined to shut down private banks conflicting with state-
backed institutions, passed legislation in 1816 closing the private banks. The Western Bank of 
Virginia, the Saline Company, the Ohio Company, and the Farmer’s Mechanics’ and Merchants’ 
Bank of Jefferson, suspended operations by August 31, 1818.  The removal of the private banks 
minimized competition with the Commonwealth’s Bank of Virginia. However, the removal of the 
private banks did little to infuse greater capital into the western Virginian region. Political concerns 
were raised that the series of small banks would minimize the control that the state leadership held 
over the banks’ investments and management.21 Virginia’s legislature established new state-
chartered banks in Wheeling between 1818 and 1834: the Northwestern Bank of Virginia (NWVA) 
and Merchants’ and Mechanics’ Bank of Wheeling (MMB). These institutions provided westerners 
                     
20 George T. Starnes, Sixty Years of Branch Banking in Virginia (New York: Macmillan Company, 1931), 34-39. 
21 Starnes, Sixty Years, 60-63. 
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with financial institutions to fund ongoing internal improvement projects in the region throughout the 
rest of the antebellum period.  
Government intervention through the banking sector influenced ways in which western 
Virginians acquired capital and controlled their own debt. Western Virginia’s autonomy was 
undermined by the involvement of the state government in minimizing western control over the 
banks and reducing the region’s overarching investment capabilities. Government interference 
throughout the antebellum era led to unacceptably large financial commitments that western 
Virginians did not actually generate. After decades of government interference, the Wheeling 
Intelligencer encouraged citizens to consider the political implications of continuing to allow state-
owned institutions to drive bank circulation when “our debt and taxes are already high.” Instead, the 
western economy should be able to administer its own bank notes because “The amount of bank note 
circulation in any particular region should be limited and controlled by the necessities of the business 
of that region.”22 While the North Western Bank of Virginia and the Merchants’ and Mechanics’ 
Bank provided banking institutions to serve Wheeling and their neighboring cities, the banks were 
relatively small compared to the rest of the state-owned banks. Individually, these two banks 
represented Virginia’s smallest state-owned banks.  
Western Virginians sought to have regionally owned banks as a means of controlling capital 
and minimizing overall debt. Western Virginia’s regional community was built on the potentially 
vast commercial network within the Ohio River Valley. It spanned northward to Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania and Zanesville, Ohio, as far west as Vincennes, Indiana and as far south as Nashville, 
Tennessee.  This was central to their identity.23 Regional communities understood both their rates of 
                     
22 “Banks and Banking” Wheeling Intelligencer, (Wheeling, West Virginia), October 19, 1855. 
23 Kim M. Gruenwald, River of Enterprise: The Commercial Origins of Regional Identity in the Ohio Valley, 1790-
1850 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 40-41. 
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consumption and how investments could achieve the targeted profitability. Historian Kim Gruenwald 
linked the debates over fiscal influence and control as a central point of contention between the 
broader Ohio River Valley region and eastern authorities: “Many Ohio River Valley residents … 
found their western identity in confronting eastern politicians and bankers. Westerners struggled with 
the lack of specie and resented the East’s stranglehold on banking policy.”24 Western Virginians had 
neither the political control nor the capital to invest in their targeted improvements. These limitations 
on fiscal autonomy led western Virginians to commit to investments and acquire debt that enhanced 
connectivity to the rest of the Ohio River Valley region. Internal improvement projects improved 
these connections. 
Easterners viewed western internal improvements as necessary for expanding the 
Commonwealth’s international presence and the respective debt should be shared throughout the 
state.  Unlike the constitutional convention of 1829, the east now looked to incorporate the west’s 
growing commercial capabilities into the east’s strategy to make Virginia into a global competitor. 
Railroads, canals, and turnpikes reflected important means toward becoming a central player in the 
growing Atlantic trade network. State leadership committed millions in public funds toward a 
statewide improvement plan. During the 1850 Constitutional Convention, political leaders focused 
on the shared burden of the investments. In the twenty years since Randolph accused westerners of 
buying their way into the political fold, easterners now focused on incorporating the west as a viable 
contributor to the Commonwealth’s future. Richmond’s R.C. Stanard challenged convention 
members to acknowledge the shared responsibility for the mounting debt: “The west is the growing 
portion of the state … it already exercises a most potent influence over the subject of internal 
improvements … and augment its population and wealth has the internal improvement debt of the 
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State been swelled from one million dollars in 1829 to some eighteen or twenty million [dollars] in 
1851.”25 Eastern Virginians viewed the debt in terms of how the improvements influenced the west’s 
access to the rest of the state. The promise and potential of the west changed how eastern leaders 
viewed the region and their spending. Since the convention in 1830 when Randolph raised concerns 
over a western willingness to use credit to “acquire” an elite status, the west now reflected a quasi-
colonial region that existed to provide resources for the east’s benefit.   
 Western Virginians expressed the desire for autonomy by differentiating between debt that 
facilitated local commercial growth and debt created through state intervention. Internal 
improvement projects reflected a central area of political excitement and economic fantasy. 
However, in the Appalachian region, these improvements became essential investments in order for 
increased commercial growth and regional connectivity. In Kentucky, for example, the state 
understood the inherent rewards that could be realized by forming regional and communal 
connectivity.  “Despite the issue of state debt, the completed regional turnpikes functioned as ‘great 
baseline roads’, effectively arterials to which local-scale neighborhood access roads could be 
connected.”26 Internal improvements, despite the inherent debt associated with the project, reflected 
regional efforts to shape power and authority without the clear support of state leadership.  
Prior to the development of their own projects, the National Road project placed Wheeling at 
the center of political discussions about economic development. When Ohio applied for statehood in 
1802, Congress granted the request that a small portion of the state’s land would be used for a road to 
traverse Ohio toward St. Louis. Subsequently, Congress authorized funds for a road to be built from 
Cumberland, Maryland to the banks of the Ohio River through Wheeling, which became a central 
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intersection for western travelers. A traveling writer illustrated the Road’s impact on Wheeling: “The 
transportation upon [the Road] of the eastern and western mail [carriers] made the Wheeling post 
office one of the largest distributing offices in the county. It had been an important auxiliary to the 
prosperity of the county and this portion of the country.” Wheeling was on the national radar for its 
role in connecting the east and the west. The national investment was a significant $7.5 million to 
construct and maintain the road from about 1818 to 1836.27 The National Road eventually became a 
costly and outdated means of transporting large supplies of people and material. While Virginia’s 
political leadership focused on improving connectivity within their own state, western Virginians 
focused on internal improvements capable of linking the nation’s east and west and re-positioning the 
region as a growing commercial and political power. The growing infrastructure provided western 
leaders with growing ambitions to compete in the growing national and international political 
economy.  
Within Ohio County, two internal improvement projects reflect the region’s commitments: 
the Wheeling Suspension Bridge and the Hempfield Railroad.  The bridge provided a clear example 
of Wheeling’s interest in uniting the eastern and western portions of the United States. Crossing the 
Ohio River, the bridge transported large amounts of commodities carried by wagons and railcars. 
The bridge provided both Wheeling and the states around western Virginia with a point of 
geographic and political connectivity.  Western Virginians also championed the Baltimore and 
Ohio’s Railroad (B&O) Hempfield Railroad Extension. Linking Wheeling with Pennsylvania and 
Ohio, the Hempfield provided the region with a formal example of how the transportation 
innovations would enhance both western Virginia and the entire region.  Both projects required 
public and private financial commitments. The debts to undertake these projects were investments 
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western Virginians understood and supported within the confines of Virginia’s broader internal 
improvement policies. Local interests conflicted with state interests. Historian John Majewski, in his 
comparison of Virginia and Pennsylvania antebellum internal improvements, argues that Virginia’s 
intrastate urban rivalries, while not entirely unique to the Commonwealth, were a significant factor in 
how western Virginians understood internal improvements as being more local improvements versus 
statewide enhancements.28 Development costs were distributed across multiple parties and the 
benefits were recognized throughout the region. The Suspension Bridge and the Hempfield Railroad 
provided Wheeling and western Virginia with key political and commercial connections to 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Understanding the development of both projects sheds light on 
how western Virginians shaped the meaning of debt to emphasize shared benefit and the national 
good. 
The Wheeling Suspension Bridge provided a central point of passage for transporting people 
and materials along the National Road. More importantly, the bridge reflected western Virginians’ 
willingness to assume public debt funded at the local level that led to greater regional solidarity and 
serve as an example of the west’s ability to compete with the east with internal innovations. Civil 
Engineer Charles Ellet provided an annual report on the design and estimated resources required to 
construct the suspension bridge. Ellet praised the project for its design and influence on the region, 
“In the Wheeling Bridge, the entire cost of the cables for a single span … has the advantage of 
leaving the navigation of the great river unimpeded [and] presenting an edifice, when finished, of far 
greater beauty and much more commanding effect.” The bridge’s costs were estimated at  
$210,000.29 The debt was a fair price for a project that would allow Wheeling to be a center piece in 
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a great plan to link Ohio and eastern commercial centers. Ellet proclaimed that the costs were central 
to an improvement plan that was reliant upon Wheeling’s central location: “I consider, therefore, that 
the Ohio Central rail-road must pass east and west through Ohio, touching at all the principal towns, 
and strike the river at Wheeling… and carry it on to the tide water.”30 Traffic on the National Road 
and several of the region’s railroads would pass through Wheeling and toward the growing markets. 
The investment in the bridge served both the Ohio County community and the broader region. 
Western Pennsylvanians and Virginians reinforced their shared commercial and political interests 
through the extension of the Baltimore and Ohio (B&O) railroad into the Ohio River Valley region.  
The collective interests of local investors and public administrators were bolstered through 
the adoption of the Hempfield Railroad. As an extension of the larger B&O system, Hempfield  
linked western Virginians and Pennsylvanians. Both states shared in the joint financing through 
public bonds offered by Ohio County, Virginia and Washington County, Pennsylvania. Most 
importantly, the railroad reflected an important softening of the borders between Pennsylvania and 
Virginia. An 1852 Hempfield Railroad Company report proclaimed, “It is of great importance the 
geography of Virginia and Pennsylvania should be appreciated; for the charter granted to the 
Hempfield Rail Road Company is the only charter that has been conceded by the state of Virginia for 
any rail road passing …from Pennsylvania into Ohio.” The total project was estimated to cost about 
$2.7 million. Ohio and Washington Counties agreed to support the railroad’s development by 
backing the development costs with public investments. While Ohio County’s public debt in 1852 
was $37,000, the county agreed to acquire an additional $150,000 in stock payments toward its fair 
share of the total costs required to develop the connection between Wheeling and Washington 
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County.31  Agreeing to share the costs of the project was a key aspect to the Hempfield’s successful 
completion. Similar to the suspension bridge, the bridge both defined and contributed to western 
Virginia’s interest in creating regional political stability in Ohio and Pennsylvania. 
Although politically advantageous for westerners, the projects received less attention from 
eastern Virginians. Instead of public acclaim, the projects produced stories of salaciousness and 
audacity and served less as examples of regional glory. The internal improvements reconfirmed the 
western region’s untamed culture. Richmond’s Daily Dispatch reported how the bridge was 
conducive to suicide attempts and malfeasance. In detailing the multiple instances in which people 
were using the bridge to attempt suicide, the newspaper reported that “The suspension bridge at 
Wheeling is becoming decidedly famous as a crossing place for young women who wish to pass over 
the gulf which separates this world from the other.”32 Furthermore, the bridge served as a remote 
location for theft. After a series of failed attempts by local thieves, the newspaper reported, “… an 
attempt was made to file off the wire cables of the new suspension bridge over Wheeling … but 
fortunately, the scoundrel was interrupted before he made progress.”33 These incidences reflected a 
notably different image of the bridge and its impact on Virginia’s political economy. Western 
Virginians understood this debt as a mechanism for attempting to maintain their own sense of 
authority and influence in the growing economy, while easterners viewed the improvements as 
immoral examples of impending dependency and failure. While western Virginians continued to 
acknowledge the need for legitimate indebtedness, they often struggled with state authorities that 
brought politically charged debt to the west through the county court system. 
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Debt collection and lawsuits over indebtedness provided communities with central venues for 
bringing disparate sections together and disputing inherently political financial exchanges. Historian 
E. Lee Shepard signified the importance of the county courts in shaping the local community 
identity: “[County residents] much more readily thought of themselves as neighbors in a county 
setting. On court day, the gathering of fellow residents from across a county brought into sharp focus 
the shared needs, concerns, and interests of the local rural population.”34  Sheriffs and law 
enforcement officials maintained regional debt collection processes. Delinquent tax payers, insolvent 
debtors, or failed commercial investors interacted with county officials mediating debt issues. 
Residents from Ohio, Brooke, and Monongalia counties interacted with a cadre of creditors through 
the courts: railroad and canal developers, state-owned banks, and the federal government. Western 
Virginians developed conflicting insights into what debt meant in the current political economy. 
Commercial debt lawsuits reflected the price of autonomy and growth for the sovereign area. 
Government debt lawsuits, including those by state-owned banks, generated concerns that western 
Virginians were controlled and dependent upon the Commonwealth’s and national political 
leadership.  
Debt collection was one of the most commonly occurring functions for local law 
enforcement and court systems. County courts provided an important setting in which multiple 
sections of society intersected. Sheriffs were responsible for collecting taxes required by federal, 
state, and county laws. Each year, the courts and the sheriffs worked in concert on tax collection 
efforts. Sheriffs and their constables would go throughout the county and collect taxes from the 
citizenry. After all collection attempts were exhausted, the sheriff constructed a list of all people who 
could not pay the levies. The copy of the list would be posted on the courthouse door and the 
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delinquent tax payers would have a month to come forward to pay the debt.35  This process of 
publicly extracting debtors from the community emerges as a key political process in regions where 
opposition to taxes and financial burdens existed.  
The county court system reflected a problem throughout the state because of the undue 
influence that justices could create through their punishments. Courts served as essential institutions 
for managing the affairs of local politics and financial issues. Debt-generated issues, which 
manifested from the lack of control over the capital and internal improvements, played out in the 
courts. While this matter did not reflect a form of eastern coercion or control, western politicians 
placed the court system as a key source in creating financial burdens. During an 1851 Constitutional 
Convention speech, Morgantown resident, Waitman Willey, addressed the “deficiencies of our 
present system of County Courts [and] the evils of the system as at present existing.” Willey argued 
that the approach for appointing justices was deeply flawed. Most of the judicial tribunals were 
“composed of men that have no knowledge of the laws they pretend to expound.” The lack of justice 
tenures and the potential for fraud concerned Willey. These concerns, however, became most 
prevalent when the local community would be at risk by the court’s role in managing tax debt and 
funding, “A justice who is interested in making the appropriation to be made will gather around him 
… a sufficient number of other Justices to accomplish this objective, who direct the appropriation to 
be made.”36 Willey’s argument, embedded within a broader concern over state taxation and political 
representation, linked western Virginian concerns between financial obligations and government 
interference. The County courts, prompted by state demands for tax revenues, influenced how 
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western Virginians understood indebtedness. The perspectives were bolstered through the lawsuits 
that took place in western courthouses each year. 
County debt lawsuits brought western Virginians directly in touch with a host of plaintiffs 
claiming reimbursement for failed public obligations to the federal, state, and local governments. 
Failed tax payments provided a contrasting form of debt payment from the traditional exchanges 
between a debtor and creditor. These debts were not produced from the exchange of promissory 
notes, currency, or materials. Instead, the debt was created by federal payments for national security 
and protection of American freedoms. Failed federal excise tax payments led to the 1817 case of The 
United States of America vs. Samuel Barr, Nicholas Moreland, and John Moreland.37 The case 
reflected the challenges presented by government intervention in the western Virginia region. A 
principal form of financial responsibility developed after America’s wars was the collection of excise 
taxes on commodity production. One of the more politically controversial taxes was the excise taxes 
on whiskey.  After the Revolutionary War, the national government assumed the states’ war debts 
and the development of a national deficit. This decision increased the nation’s access to greater levels 
of credit and finance. However, it also shaped the need to create excise tax programs to repay the 
significant public debt developed through the war efforts. One of the key measures the federal 
government deployed was a nationwide Spirits Excise Tax Act of 1792 that authorized states to have 
county-based inspection offices tasked with annually monitoring and tracking still production.38 A 
subsequent Excise Tax Act on distilled spirits was passed in 1813 and 1814 to cover the military 
debts incurred through the War of 1812. The case of the United States v. Samuel Barr was filed in 
1817 for Barr’s failed tax payments of about $150.  The case reflected an important adjustment to 
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how indebtedness was formed: the creditor was neither local nor a part of the regional community. 
Instead, the creditor was the United States soliciting payment for the exchange of national security 
and defense.39 As a political measure, the excise tax reflected a point of political debate and concern 
for the westerners. These types of pressures and concerns demonstrated by western Virginians 
reflected a broader issue that indebtedness was serving a larger role in influencing the nation’s 
political economy.  
The development of a global economy in which capital and credit flowed from 
anonymous financial institutions forced Americans to redefine how indebtedness supported the 
formation of political identities. For many nineteenth-century Americans, indebtedness ran 
contrary to the thriving spirit of economic independence and republicanism. To a degree, debt 
conveyed failure and immorality—characteristics that conflicted with the virtuous middle-class 
American citizen.40 These sentiments, however, ignored both the kinds of debt that developed 
and the political implications relating to the debt-related disputes. Western Virginians’ 
perceptions of debt reflected important changes in the national economy. Debt could be 
acknowledged rather than disputed. Financial commitments became essential for adapting to the 
new market economy. A central factor in driving these changes was increased public sector 
involvement in sustaining and providing private sector offerings. Public officials intermingled 
concepts of public service (representation, taxation) with concerns of private offerings (corporate 
flexibility, revenue sharing). Americans began to understand debt in its bifurcated terms of 
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public commitment and commercial ambition. As western Virginians demonstrated throughout 
the antebellum period, Americans supported financial burdens for internal improvements, 
political solvency, and economic growth. However, taxation and public bonds thrust upon 
Americans, who were not clear as to either when or why they accepted the burden, remained a 
key source of political tension.  Financial panics and crises were no longer defined in terms of 
failed exchanges between local, personal relationships. Instead, the financial disputes existed 
between regional financial and political institutions responsible to sustain the community’s needs 
and requirements. The nation’s political conflicts in the 1860s between secessionists and 
unionists changed the way in which political economy issues were resolved. Discussions over 
reputation and credit were now replaced with disputes over liberty and loyalty. The nation 
struggled to adapt to the rapidly changing market economy, which required Americans to accept 
responsibility for indebtedness incurred for public purposes, funded by private creditors, and 
shared by all. 
Public responsibility for industrial development blurred the lines between commercial 
and public debt. State leadership used the interest of the people to drive publicly funded projects 
without concerns over rising public debt. The nation’s need both to prepare for and exploit the 
growing international trade markets required community investments, interlinking commercial 
centers around internal improvement initiatives. Brian Murphy and John Larson highlight the 
manifestations of public-private investments and funding internal improvement projects with 
public funding produced the potential for risk. Murphy concludes his analysis of New York’s 
antebellum political economy by arguing that this type of environment blurred the roles of the 
public and private stakeholders. As long as state objectives were supported, “the corporations, 
monopolies, and other legal instrumentalities were hybrid mixed-economy creations that 
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comingled capital and public authority, they were components of the state.”41  These 
“instrumentalities” provided the funding mechanisms for internal improvement projects, as John 
Larson argued, that “drove lawmakers to plunge into debt on behalf of their constituents: in 
hopes of magnificent rewards … but also in conscious self-defense against the demands of the 
people” who wanted to shape the nation’s strongest political economies.42  Political 
representation and commercial success fed one another. In March 1859, North Carolina’s Moses 
Bledsoe articulated his defense of a program that minimized public debt incurred “on account of 
the various schemes of internal improvement.” As was often stated in newspapers, “But this 
debt, for the payment of which the faith and honor of the State are pledged, was made for the 
benefits of all citizens and property in the State for promoting the general interest and prosperity 
of the state at large.”43 Unfettered public spending on internal improvements underlined a rising 
dependency on financial investments to meet the public’s growing transportation and 
commercial interest. The seeds of private dependency on public providers were sown in the 
decade before a civil war that dismantled public perceptions of the political economy.  
The impact of credit and financial speculation, which drove panics, also served to change 
perceptions of risk for Americans. Banks unable or unwilling to provide customers with species 
payment for their local currency often led to banking crises or full-fledged panics. Transatlantic 
bank wars during the 1830s and 1840s provided Americans with an uncertainty in banks and 
their role in the economy. However, American commitments to more structured financing and 
access to credit served to acclimate Americans to financial turmoil and risk. Cultural historian 
Jessica Lepler focuses on the economic panic of 1837 as an important transformation in 
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American perceptions of financial risk. Lepler argues that “Individuals, communities, and even 
nations experienced different versions of the panic in 1837 colored by cultural, political and 
economic contexts … [forcing each community] to reevaluate its local and national structures of 
political economy.” 44 Ironically, increased interactions with panics and crises led to more 
adaptable understandings of how to manage them. The politics of banks and species exchanges 
remained a part of the American fabric throughout the nineteenth century.  
The nation’s formulas for establishing a coherent political economy, which included public 
investments in infrastructure designed to connect the nation’s resources and services, was fractured 
by secessionist and unionist debates that led to a civil war. The competing political perspectives that 
created the split between eastern and western Virginians provided similar boundaries for a split 
between Virginia’s Unionist and secessionist advocates. William Link simplified the distinction 
between western and eastern Virginians on the eve of the Civil War: “There was no true affinity 
between East and West, and the most distinguishing characteristic was slavery.”45 Westerners had 
been deprived of control and influence. Most importantly, “Inequitable representation [and] a 
constitutional structure favoring slaveholders required them to pay an ‘unequal share’ of taxes.” As 
the state leadership converged in a final convention to vote on secession from the Union, Westerners 
began to focus on freeing themselves from a dependence on the east and becoming an independent 
state.       
By April 1861, state leaders repeatedly converged to determine if the Commonwealth should 
remain in the Union or secede. Unionists articulated the need for commitment and loyalty to a federal 
government committed to investing in the protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
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Eastern Virginian and secessionist Robert Montague argued that Virginia’s role as a political leader 
of the minority perspective could be expressed through secession. Montague asserted, “Virginia was 
the first State on this Continent that ever exercised the great doctrine of secession [and] she did not 
go about to consult border States, to see what they would do. In the plentitude of her sovereignty, and 
in the depth of her patriotism, she severed her connection to the British government… .”46 Eastern 
Virginians viewed secession as a means of exercising power as a member of a minority against a 
larger majority. Westerners responded by recognizing the value of revolution—when there was a 
collective benefit to be created. Unionist support, Chapman Stuart responded to eastern demands for 
secession by arguing westerners believed in the “right of revolution” if rights were being infringed 
upon and the Constitution legitimized perceived wrongs. However, this was not the case. Secession 
was the not “remedy of all evils [but] was the aggravation of these evils.”47 Eastern Virginians, who 
placed their loyalties to a patriotic past and the roots of the nation, victoriously secured the vote for 
secession in April 1861. The Commonwealth of Virginia seceded from the Union. Within weeks of 
the decision, western Virginia focused on their own secession processes and gaining independence. 
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Chapter 2: Who Is to Be Bound for This Debt? Resolving Issues of Debt during 
the Civil War and Reconstruction Era 
 
 
Western Virginians responded quickly. Eastern Virginians successfully secured the necessary 
votes to secede from the Union in the Commonwealth’s April 1861 convention. Virginia joined a 
southern confederacy focused on preserving a culture and economy built on states’ rights, slave 
labor, and an agricultural economy. Westerners rejected the convention’s decision and mobilized to 
determine next steps. Morgantown residents created a series of resolutions reflecting their 
commitment to the Union: “Secession [from Virginia] is the only remedy for all real and supposed 
wrongs [and] the day is near when the West will … dissolve all civil and political connections with 
the East and remain firmly under the Stars and Stripes.” 48 Western Virginia delegates, returning 
from the Commonwealth’s convention, acted swiftly to capitalize on the regional cry for unity and 
Union. Within days of returning from Richmond, a meeting of 1,200 western Virginians converged 
in the town of Clarksburg—a commercial junction point on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad that 
linked the state’s eastern and western interests—and created a political plan of action focused on 
western Virginia’s independence.   
Led by John Carlisle, western county leaders created a political manifesto, an address to the 
people of western Virginia declaring “that her people should be united in action and harmonious in 
purpose—there being perfect identity of interests in time of war as well as in peace.” Representatives 
from western Virginia agreed to meet in Wheeling to declare their “independence from the 
Commonwealth of Virginia and the reorganization of the commonwealth on a loyal basis.” 49 
Carlisle’s speech and the Wheeling Convention reflected a call to political action to expand the 
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western Virginia political base and created a unified plan to secede from eastern Virginia. These 
events provided more western Virginians with broader opportunities to influence the course of the 
region. Of the delegates that converged in Wheeling, “only three had taken part in the Virginia 
Secession Convention earlier in the year.”50 Regional leaders committed to political reforms that 
were democratic and proportionally representative to the interests of the entire region. After years of 
dependence on eastern Virginians, western Virginians rallied around regional solidarity and Union 
support that had been developing throughout the antebellum period. Regionally-dedicated internal 
improvement programs and a willingness to invest in the regional identity provided western 
Virginians with a stronger collective identity. Western Virginia’s roadmap included debt 
management processes that ironically did not produce the complete independence and financial 
autonomy that the political leaders sought. Instead, the political processes merely shifted the western 
Virginia dependency from eastern Virginia to the Union and actually increased the forms of debt that 
the new state would acknowledge. 
West Virginia’s efforts to gain independence and achieve statehood were shaped by debt 
management processes that shifted political dependence from Virginia to Washington, D.C. during 
the Civil War and Reconstruction eras. The persistent need to resolve debt issues plagued the state’s 
efforts during constitutional conventions and postbellum resolutions. The central processes of debt 
management—debt acknowledgement, debt accumulation, and debt resolution—accentuated 
regional and national political differences. Debt acknowledgement required West Virginia to 
contribute personnel and administrative resources to support the ongoing war effort. Through the 
constitutional conventions and drive for statehood, West Virginia’s political leaders acknowledged 
and accepted financial responsibility for the establishment of a new government and military. Debt 
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accumulation represented a political willingness to create financial obligations for long-term efforts 
and investment in regional and national identity. West Virginia’s commitments to regionally funded 
internal improvement projects were coupled with rising wartime obligations and political 
commitments to the Restored Government of Virginia and the Federal Government. The final 
element, debt resolution, complicated West Virginia’s new political position. Efforts to relieve debt 
responsibilities generated conflicting understandings of financial obligations and liabilities that left 
West Virginians unsure as to how to manage their debt issues. Debt management processes informed 
regional and national debates over constitutional amendments designed both to acknowledge and 
repudiate debt incurred for different reasons but in the same way. West Virginians’ understandings of 
debt management—informed by national debates of honor and loyalty—led to a postbellum political 
standoff with the Commonwealth of Virginia about the long-standing public debt obligation.  
Regional delegates used constitutional conventions to discuss credit, reputation, and honor to 
support their own claims to independence and condemn the actions of their opponents. During West 
Virginia’s constitutional debates, delegates attempted to fortify the region’s commercial interests 
without following in the ill-fated footsteps of the eastern Virginians who joined the Confederacy. 
Preston County’s John Brown proclaimed, “It was said by John Randolph in the [Virginia] 
convention of 1829-1830 that no people who were desperately indebted could bear a regular and 
sober government. [Virginia] had run into debt and destroyed her reputation and credit in the world 
and went into secession… .”51 Ironically, western Virginians now agreed with eastern Virginian John 
Randolph that profligate spending was a source of state failure. However, it was not the prospective 
new state that would fail but Randolph’s Virginia. While Brown contended that the new state should 
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learn from Virginia’s anticipated demise, the perspectives on fiscal conservatism were not 
universally shared. Wood County’s William Stevenson encouraged public debt created through 
private investment as the most efficient and practical approach for planning the state’s finances: 
“[What] particular improvement [is] needed in this new state that private capital and private 
enterprise will not enter upon and accomplish … more speedily than the State would do it?”52 The 
leaders of the presumed new state did not want to be overly cautious and waste the region’s 
opportunity for glory. The commercial promises of political freedom required investment and 
advancement. While the Commonwealth had failed, western Virginians believed a balanced 
approach for investment and incurring debt could be struck. Harrison County’s Thomas Harrison 
concluded, “It strikes me [that] the object of this section is not to prevent internal improvements by 
the State at all. But it is to provide that they shall be made on the most economical plan.”53 
Perspectives of debt, which drove efforts for independence during the antebellum period, now 
dictated West Virginia’s perspectives towards creating a new state that differed from the “mother 
country,” Virginia.  
Debt management reflected an important national issue due to the changes in public 
spending that led to unprecedented spikes in public debt. While antebellum public debt grew due 
to regional investments in internal improvements, Civil War era public debt grew due to the 
national conflict over the preservation of the Union.  In 1860, the federal government’s public 
debt was $65 million; by 1866, the debt had grown to $3 billion. Warring states amassed an 
estimated $468 million in debt, respectively.54 These staggering increases in commitments and 
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obligations raised a key question: who was responsible for the debt? Anthropologist David 
Graeber asserts that all debt was “a perversion of a promise. [Debt] is a promise corrupted by 
math and violence.”55  The incurrence of debt during a time of conflict (Civil War) and 
reconciliation (Reconstruction) led to broken promises and debates over the promise itself. 
Addressing what the promise entailed dogged West Virginians’ efforts for both statehood and 
autonomy throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century. Allegations of disloyalty and 
unfair political practices complicated promises of payment. Managing public debt as a public 
service to constituents became a political process that was debated, questioned, and adjusted to 
meet the needs of West Virginia.  
 Debt acknowledgement reflected the incurrence of financial commitments as a measure of 
loyalty and a willingness to share in the burden.  Acknowledging debt during the Civil War reflected 
a political willingness to contribute to the ongoing military and administrative obligations deemed 
necessary to suppress the rebellion. In sum, this debt reflected unplanned and unclear investments 
that were made to support a shared outcome. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, debt 
acknowledgement was used as a political tool for creating solidarity. Treasury Secretary Alexander 
Hamilton linked notions of debt and loyalty in the 1790s. Hamilton reformed the nation’s political 
economy through a federal plan to assume state Revolutionary War debts as the basis for an excise 
tax that funded broad services, such as national security and infrastructure development. These 
actions created shared political interests financed by a shared common burden. Hamilton’s plan 
created loyal allegiance by binding the public’s financial interests to the government’s interest.56  
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Western Virginia’s attempts to achieve statehood required the acknowledgement of both new 
operating expenses and a long-term investment in Virginia’s public debt. A willingness to manage 
new financial obligations provided a first key step toward political unity and statehood. Regional 
delegates converged at the Wheeling Convention shortly after eastern Virginians decided to secede 
from the Union. Westerners established the political framework necessary to establish “a position of 
loyalty [and] a new and separate State in the glorious United States.”57 The Wheeling Convention 
promptly focused on establishing itself as the “Restored Government of Virginia” and creating the 
necessary infrastructure to operate a new government. As a precursor to statehood, western 
Virginians required the approval of its mother state (Virginia) to break away. Under the assumption 
that the Richmond government would never authorize such a secession, westerners promptly 
regrouped as the Restored Government. Western delegates, who now represented western Virginia 
and eastern Virginia interests, nominated Francis Pierpont as the new governor and Arthur Boreman 
as the president of the convention. In June 1861, the convention members passed several ordinances 
to reflect their control of the Commonwealth’s operations, including reorganizing the Virginia 
government, declaring the Richmond convention of 1861 null and void, calling up a militia, and 
appointing a state Treasurer and Auditor to manage finances. However, the most pertinent ordinance 
was passed on August 20, 1861: “An Ordinance to provide for the formation of a new state out of a 
portion of the territory of this state.”58 While the original ordinance provided for a new state called 
Kanawha, the passing of this ordinance served as the basis for the state of West Virginia. The 
                     
57 Virginia Convention Wheeling, Virginia, Journal of the Convention Assembled At Wheeling: On the 11th of June, 
1861 (Wheeling, 1861), 19-20. 
58 West Virginia State Legislature, Ordinances and acts of the restored government of Virginia, prior to the 
formation of the state of West Virginia : with the constitution and laws of the state of West Virginia, to March 2d, 
1866. (Wheeling: J. Frew, Public Printer, 1866) 6-16.  
36 
 
Restored Government and the delegates of the proposed state now required federal support and 
authorization.  
 Federal acknowledgement of the Wheeling Convention and their proposed political changes 
reflected West Virginia’s inherent shift in dependence from Virginia to Washington, D. C. and 
acknowledgement of new debt. Pierpont promptly communicated to President Lincoln that the 
Restored Government stood ready to defend itself from the “evil-minded persons [who] had 
organized an insurrection and rebellion in the state to overthrow the government of the state.”59 
Pierpont required federal approval and funding to create army regiments and offer commissions to 
officers to support the region’s defenses against the Confederacy. President Lincoln authorized 
military support and provided funds for the military. This met the new government’s defensive 
needs, but the state funded its own administrative and operational burdens. Western Virginians 
funded the Restored Government with nearly $90,000 to establish public operations. Local banks 
provided a loan of $10,000 for per diem expenses, $28,000 in specie allocated for a public building, 
and $50,000 from the federal government for financial support. These investments, while used to 
establish the Restored Government that relocated to Alexandria, Virginia, reflected western 
Virginia’s initial acknowledgement of the financial investments necessary for statehood.  The 
dependence on the United States did not reduce West Virginia’s financial obligations; instead, the 
debt continued to increase as the nation’s leaders debated West Virginia’s viability as a new state.   
A willingness to share in the financial burdens emerged as an important aspect to the nation’s 
adoption of West Virginia as a state. In December 1862, Kentucky’s John Crittenden debated on the 
House floor the legitimacy of western Virginia becoming a state if the debt issue was not reconciled. 
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The public-private partnerships that led to Virginia’s outstanding debt remained a concern for the 
Kentuckian who did not want to ignore the issues of broader fiscal responsibility and admit West 
Virginia into the Union. Virginia’s well-known public debt of nearly $30 million dollars was an 
established fact and Crittenden needed assurances that if West Virginia was to be admitted, the debt 
would addressed.  He implored the House leadership, “Mr. Speaker, there is another question to 
which I invite your attention. The old State of Virginia, when she embraced east and west, owed a 
large debt. She owes it today. Who is to be bound for this debt?” Waitman Willey assured Congress 
and Crittenden that the debt was being addressed through West Virginia’s constitution.60 The West 
Virginia Constitutional Convention’s Finance Committee included a section in the proposed 
constitution that stipulated that West Virginia would assume responsibility for a share of the Virginia 
public debt and would pay for their share through a “sinking fund sufficient to pay the accruing 
interest and redeem the principal within thirty-four years.”61 Western Virginia’s debt 
acknowledgement demonstrated both a commitment to meet the public demands of the new state and 
the Union.   
The price for statehood, however, included more than just the share of Virginia’s public debt. 
In 1863, Clarksburg’s Thomas Harrison outlined the significant commitments that the state was 
signing up for: “The debt keeps accumulating upon us. We will have to shoulder our share of the 
Virginia debt, and it cannot be less than $6,000,000, and at its lowest rate it will take at least 
$360,000 [in annual payments]… . The United States is levying [a] direct tax on us of $200,000 
more.” In total, West Virginia’s annual debt was amounting to $820,000. Congress saddled West 
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Virginians with a significant tax debt and demanded that the new state address the Virginia public 
debt issue as a contingency of statehood.62 By 1863, Congress and the President recognized West 
Virginia as the nation’s 35th state. Through the process, however, West Virginia constitutionally and 
politically acknowledged significant liabilities that they would be accountable to repay. Resolution of 
the Virginia public debt remained a significant challenge throughout the remainder of the Civil War 
due to the bifurcation of eastern Virginia politics. 
West Virginia’s political leadership believed that the region was on the cusp of both political 
and economic glory. With independence nearly in hand, antebellum goals of financing internal 
improvement projects that linked West Virginia with the broader Ohio River Valley remained intact. 
The political leadership confidently believed the state and its resources were positioned for future 
success and propped up their abilities to supersede the economic status of even the Virginia 
Commonwealth. Governor Arthur Boreman, in an 1863 message, acknowledged that prior to the 
war, the forty-eight West Virginia counties’ contributions exceeded the tax revenue contributions of 
the eastern portion that remained with the Commonwealth. The solid financial status combined with 
“the spirit of enlightened and patriotic statesmanship in the organization and administration of the 
government to establish the progress and prosperity of the new State” were the keys to West 
Virginia’s success. Permitting the accumulation of debt was necessary for economic development, 
but it also saddled the state with future payments. During the wartime constitutional conventions, 
West Virginia attempted to establish democratic processes for managing and administering state 
policies and lawmaking.  Convention members debated allowing for constitutional amendments, 
effective taxation approaches, and internal improvement plans. Historian John Stealey argues that 
West Virginians rejected “[Eastern] Virginian tactics to thwart democratic reform by writing 
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constitutions without a specific amendment process, by incorporating unenforceable possible 
remedies for reapportionment and leaving calls for future conventions in the hands of undemocratic 
legislatures ….”63 West Virginia’s government provided a superior example of an effective political 
economy that was democratically fair and fiscally responsible. Seemingly, West Virginia’s 
independence was legitimized by its citizens’ ability to self-govern more effectively. However, 
through each of its attempts to validate independence, West Virginians were actually shifting their 
dependence from eastern Virginia to Washington, D.C. 
 Debt accumulation processes adopted more rigid fiscal restraint in planning for future 
investments and obligations. State delegates argued for fixed caps on the amount of public debt that 
could be incurred. Unfettered spending on internal improvements required controlled planning. West 
Virginians fundamentally created a hard political line between their responsibilities as a member of 
the Commonwealth and their responsibilities as the stewards of their own resources. West Virginia, 
in optimistic hopes that the state would now be held responsible for only debts incurred by the new 
state, encouraged fiscal responsibility. Wood County’s Peter Van Winkle argued that accumulating 
debt without a clear plan to pay off the debt merely produced undue burdens for current and future 
generations of West Virginians. Van Winkle contended “contracting of another debt would damn the 
credit of the State in all the markets of the world.”64 State leaders focused on proactively managing a 
potential public debt problem. J.W. Paxton, chairman of the Committee on Taxation and Finance, 
included several provisions in the new state’s constitution. Under Article 8, sections 5 and 6, the state 
would not contract debt or assume responsibility for county debt unless it was to pay for existing 
expenses, liabilities, or “defend the State in time of war.” Convention members, however, remained 
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unclear as to how the proportionality of the debt could be established if the public works were 
predominantly controlled by the seceded Virginians.  Marion County’s Hiram Haymond argued, “It 
is considered by some that on a fair settlement with eastern Virginia we will not owe them one dollar. 
[Virginia’s land] had been improved east of the mountains and they shall pay for the 
improvements.”65 Addressing Virginia’s public debt remained a challenge due to the unclear future 
of the Restored Government of Virginia and the state’s challenges in addressing their own debt 
issues.  
Throughout much of the war, eastern Virginia interests were comingled between two 
state bodies: the original Commonwealth government in Richmond and the Restored 
Government of Virginia in Alexandria. Historian Sara Bearss detailed the state’s unique “two 
state system” that allowed eastern and western Virginian representatives to remain intact 
throughout the war. Specifically, the Richmond General Assembly admitted “representatives 
from the same northern Virginia and Eastern Shore counties that also sent representatives to the 
General Assembly in Wheeling [and] Alexandria … . [Furthermore], Western Virginia counties 
continued to be represented in the General Assembly that met in Richmond during the war years 
even after referenda in those counties made them parts of the new state of West Virginia.”66 This 
split form of political representation led to several unique challenges for both sets of leadership.  
It significantly influenced how Virginia managed and administered the political economy after 
the Civil War. Consequently, Virginian debt acknowledgement and accumulation—as a 
reflection of political support and commitment—became largely dependent upon the outcome of 
the war itself and how debt would be administered during the post-war processes.  
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Virginia debt issues compounded during the 1860s largely due to the failed investment 
strategies and finances created by the war.  The antebellum internal improvement projects were 
largely financed through joint public-private partnerships based on public bonds. Bondholders 
provided the necessary capital for state acquisition of stock for private development of railroads and 
roads. Theoretically, the state, as a shareholder, would utilize railroad profits to pay the interest owed 
to the bondholders. The destruction of Virginia’s infrastructure during the Civil War compromised 
this approach and in the process, altered the state’s ability to pay its debt. The revenue-generating 
railroads were destroyed during the war and Virginia’s ability to pay their debts ceased. Interest 
payments to bondholders were halted during the war and the debt grew to $41 million by 1865. 
Reconciling the debt became a key issue for Virginia’s temporary leadership. In a private exchange 
between the governors in 1866, Pierpont extolled Boreman to “recommend and secure … an act to 
raise a sinking fund looking to the payment of your Equitable share of the debt.” Pierpont minimized 
the debt’s long-term risk to the new state: “[West Virginia] will have to pay for the amount of work 
done in W.Va on the Covington road perhaps [and] on the Winchester Road.”67 After the war, West 
Virginia’s postbellum political focus shifted toward expanding the state’s influence and utilizing the 
state’s resources to become a formidable member of the American political economy. Resolving the 
debt issue with Virginia continued to be a point of resistance for westerners against easterners.  
During the Reconstruction era, perspectives over debt accumulation influenced Virginia’s 
reentry into the Union. Virginia’s political debates no longer centered around internal improvements, 
representation rights, and the uses of credit and property as distinct forms of debt. Instead, managing 
debt emerged as a central issue for Virginians due to the very real concerns that the years of unpaid 
principal and interest payments would lead to both dishonor and insolvency. During Virginia’s 1867 
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Constitutional Convention, policy debates were anchored in concerns over debt. The Committee on 
Finance and Taxation provided a report of the State’s financial strategy, which included 16 articles 
for the state’s financial policy. Nearly all of these articles directly and indirectly addressed public 
debt. For example, Article 6 highlighted the state’s new commitment to minimize debt unless 
necessary for wartime protection, “No debt shall be contracted by the state except to meet casual 
deficits in the revenue to redeem a previous liability of the State, to suppress insurrection, repel 
invasion, or defend the State in time of War.” The state’s clear drive for transparency and 
accountability for the debt was captured by Article 16: “A full account of the State indebtedness an 
accurate statement of receipts and expenditures of the public money, shall be attached to and 
published with its laws … .” Finally, Article 13 declared, “the State shall not be a party to, or become 
interested in the work of internal improvement, nor engage in carrying on any such work.”68 Clearly, 
the Commonwealth switched priorities after the war. In order to progress, resolving the debt issue 
with West Virginia emerged as a major political reform issue.   
 Debt acknowledgement and accumulation provided the foundation for political debates over 
debt resolution and encompassed conflicting perceptions of political commitment and loyalty. 
Historically, the United States resolved public debt challenges through a two-part formula. The 
federal government assumed state debt and then issued taxes as a means of funding the debt. Federal 
assumption of state debt after the Revolutionary War and War of 1812 led to the use of an excise tax 
on whiskey. Southern rebellion costs complicated this formula. Competing public debts emerged in 
1865: the federal government incurred debt to repel the rebel efforts and the Confederacy incurred 
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public debt to stomp out an oppressive federal regime. Addressing these debts provided Union 
leadership with the means to mobilize southern support for federal obligations. States returning to the 
Union would be forced to acknowledge and contribute to paying the massive incurred federal debt. 
These principles shaped debt payment and repudiation in forcing southern commitment to the federal 
cause. In December 1865, Iowa’s congressman Hiram Price issued a resolution that stipulated “that 
no State recently in rebellion, ought to be entitled to representation, until such State shall … adopt the 
[14th] amendment to the Constitution, securing the payment of the national debt and repudiation of 
the rebel debt.”69 After the war, debt resolution merged the concept of political loyalty (paying 
national debt) with the concept of submission (repudiation of rebel debt).  
West Virginia’s leaders, who acknowledged the debt during the statehood debates, now 
balked at committing West Virginia’s resources toward the efforts of a disloyal rebel state. After the 
war ended, state leaders engaged in a series of debates with Virginia’s leadership either to resolve the 
debt issue or to rejoin the Commonwealth. Waitman Willey argued that a reunion would lead to 
significant setbacks that included, “the surrender of those fundamental reforms inaugurated under our 
new constitution, and the laws made by our legislature.” However, the key setback would be the 
impact of the enormous debt that grew during the war. Willey declared that rejoining Virginia would 
result in “enlarging our public debt for internal improvement, none of which would ever or could 
ever find their way into Western Virginia. In short, it would ruin us.”70 Underscoring Willey’s 
concerns, however, was West Virginia’s loyalty to the Union cause: “we refused to follow Virginia 
into treason and rebellion. Virginia deserted us. She was the traitor.” 71 West Virginia’s secession 
from Virginia, once considered a temporary war measure, was now a reflection of its freedom from 
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political and financial oppression. Loyalty to union was a reflection of West Virginia’s dependence 
on the U.S. government and loyalty should have protected West Virginia from any additional 
responsibility to secessionist threats. West Virginia’s leadership could not resolve the public debt 
issue through reintegrating with Virginia or accepting responsibility for an estimated one-third of the 
$40 million public debt. Acceptance reflected political regression. Instead, West Virginians would 
rely upon a stout commitment to the Union and a political settlement to resolve the debt crisis.     
Virginia’s efforts to resolve its public debt controversy highlighted critical postbellum 
challenges of resolving debt incurred for the rebellion and for the sovereignty of the state. Political 
leadership understood that resolving the debt issue was critical for the state to transition from the 
failed war effort. Virginia’s political leaders debated policies for “engrafting in the constitution being 
made an ordinance releasing the citizens of Virginia from said indebtedness … and [determine] what 
portion of the present debt of this state was contracted for the purpose of aiding the late rebellion.”72 
However, these efforts only led to the resolution of the debt covered by the 14th amendment. 
Virginians’ efforts to resolve the debt issue influenced state politics throughout the remainder of the 
nineteenth century. Incensed political reformers drove a readjustment movement in the late 1870s 
and 1880s. During the twenty post-war years, Virginia’s politicians focused on restoring the 
Commonwealth’s public and private credibility. Resolving the public debt was a central point of 
contention and focus. Virginia’s 1870 state legislature confronted a state debt of nearly $45 million. 
“Readjusters” and “Debt Payers” emerged as significant political factions framing the divergent 
views about addressing the debt commitments.  
Virginia’s state leadership created a plan that led to short-term debt relief and shifted political 
attention to West Virginia. Bondholders, who provided the initial funding for the internal 
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improvement projects in the antebellum period, pressed Virginia’s government for payment of the 
principal and interest that accumulated since the 1850s. Through a political maneuver designed to 
pacify bondholders and pressure West Virginia into paying their portion of its state’s debt, Virginia’s 
legislature passed the 1871 Funding Act that provided the funding for two-thirds of the outstanding 
debt. The remaining one-third was linked to bonded certificates that would be funded only when 
West Virginia paid Virginia for their portion of the debt.73 West Virginia continued to protest their 
overall obligations to Virginia. At the state’s 1885 Constitutional Convention, Virginia’s Democratic 
leadership declared, “The question of the State debt has ceased to be one [of] dollars and cents. It had 
become one of state sovereignty. We appeal … to all men, irrespective of party, and invite them to 
unite with us in defending the imperiled rights of the Commonwealth.”74 Simply put, Virginia was 
now politically dependent on others to restore their autonomy and honor. Investors demand for 
payment and West Virginia’s unwillingness to compromise forced Virginia to look outside their state 
to resolve the debt controversy.    
Debt did not change during the Civil War and Reconstruction era; instead, the array of 
stakeholders and the amount of debt at stake shifted perceptions on political obligations and 
economic commitments. While Unionist and Secessionist debates precipitated the war, the United 
States focused on fostering nationalist sentiments throughout the country. As Drew Faust concludes 
in her assessment of the Civil War’s influence on the United States, “[The] United States’ new and 
elevated destiny became bound up with the nation itself: its growing power, its wealth, its extent, its 
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influence.”75 The Civil War era generated several reforms that produced changes in how debt was 
accumulated and how debt issues were resolved. Antebellum debates over the role of banks and 
currency were now mollified through concerns of national solidarity and fiscal conservatism. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the failure of states to fund obligations led to public failures and 
defaults. More important, the inability to pay public debts spanned the entire century and was not 
limited to Civil War era defaults.  In the early 1840s, nine states defaulted on the obligations and over 
111 cities defaulted on public bond debt in the 1890s. This potential for public debt failure led many 
state governments to integrate effective financial management into their legal frameworks and 
processes. Unprecedented levels of state and federal debt spurred debates over how various debts 
were different and the political consequences of debt repudiation. Debt resolution emerged as either a 
formidable solution for absolving millions in unpayable debts or a shrewd mechanism for forcing 
southern rebels to acknowledge constitutional amendments and reforms. Richard Schragger argues 
that, “in an effort to rein in wayward legislatures and city councils, states embraced constitutional 
debt limitations, balanced budget mandates, public-purpose requirements, and other restrictions on 
debt and spending. The nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the ‘fiscal constitution’ in the 
states.”76 West Virginia’s constitutional acknowledgement of incurring debt for operational purposes 
and placing ceilings on public investment represented the elements of a fiscal constitution. After the 
Civil War, West Virginia served as a model state for balancing and administrating effective financial 
stewardship and avoiding the pitfalls that prompted the debt controversy. The 1872 constitution 
reflected a progressive and financially sound framework that guided the new state through 
Reconstruction-era challenges.   
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The federal government’s approach to managing the massive public debt transferred the 
inherent responsibility of economic solvency from the states to the federal government. The 
increased debt incurred through Civil War operations spurred the development of a financial system 
that mobilized large sums of capital and claimed control from the states over the distribution of 
currency and investment capabilities.77 The Civil War redefined the practical extent that the federal 
government could take to shape the American political economy. Nancy Cohen argues, “The Federal 
Government had exercised powers of revolutionary implications” such as emancipation of slaves and 
the Thirteenth Amendment that outlawed slavery in the United States.78 However, the federal 
government also utilized the unprecedented levels of public debt to urge reluctant southerners back 
into the Union and accept the abolition of slavery as a core element of a new political economy. 
Congressional leadership, through the Constitution’s 14th amendment, forgave rebel debt incurred 
during the Civil War.79  The national debt, from the Union’s perspective, remained intact and would 
be paid through tax programs. This amendment reflected a continuation of the federal government’s 
efforts to control the nation’s financing activities.  
This willingness to acknowledge rebel debt versus public debt came at a political price that 
was debated throughout the South. Debt repudiation provided a short-term benefit for a Virginia 
economy that was languishing. However, debt repudiation as a political maneuver was designed to 
justify a growing tax program and make debt resolution a national matter. Virginia’s Norfolk Post, in 
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a November 1865 editorial, questioned the subversive nature of a national debt resolution policy 
designed to “compel the payment of the debt … whether [the citizens] reside in Maine, California, or 
Texas would have to bear an equal proportion.”80 Debt resolution provided federal leadership with a 
political tool to forge national solidarity. Virginians viewed debt repudiation as a means of diluting 
the state’s authority and sharing responsibility for the payment throughout the nation. While 
Virginians viewed repudiation as an assault on their sense of honor and duty, the United States 
viewed the debt as being “against public policy, because [the debts] would be an encouragement to 
rebellion and thus a danger to the security and integrity” of the United States.”81  Paying the public 
debt was both an investment and war measure necessary for restoring the political economy and 
security of the nation. While the 14th amendment resolved the payment of public debt, West Virginia 
and Virginia remained unclear as to how their debt controversy would be resolved. This established 
the ironic dynamic that while debt repudiation created a clear avenue for Virginia to return to the 
Union, paying a fair a just proportion of the Virginia debt was the only avenue West Virginia could 
take to join the Union.  
 Paying equitable proportions of debt, however, had changed. West Virginia’s inclusion of 
proportional measures in their 1861 constitutional debates was a reflection of regional and state 
solvency. The federal government now urged the shared responsibility required to pay down the debt 
and restore the Union. Debt resolution provided federal legislators with the means to fortify the 
nation. Loyalty would be measured through postbellum support for the federal government and the 
United States. This conflicted with West Virginia’s rationale for agreeing to proportional payment of 
debt. West Virginia’s diplomatic efforts to achieve statehood through recognizing a state debt failed. 
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The state included this language into their constitution at a point in time when the magnitude of the 
war and increase in public debt was unclear. Discussions between Pierpont and Boreman focused on 
West Virginia statehood and the triumph of the Alexandria government over the Richmond 
government when the war ended. Debt acknowledgement and resolution were tools—not the end 
game—of the debates.  The politicized debates over debt led to a showdown in the highest court in 
the land.  
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Chapter 3: Make No Deep Scrutiny Into Her Mutiny: The Supreme Court’s 
Rulings in the Commonwealth of Virginia v. The State of West Virginia 
 
 
Virginia’s efforts to reconcile the public debt issue during the nineteenth century failed to 
create the compromises that the Old Dominion desperately needed. Interstate negotiations between 
Virginia and West Virginia bogged down after the war ended and devolved into a stalemate. 
Virginia’s statesmen grew concerned that the state’s reputation and sovereignty eroded each day that 
resolution was not reached. The development of a Virginia Debt Commission in 1890 provided 
negotiators with the legal authority both to appease bondholders and use the power of the Attorney 
General’s Office to settle with West Virginia. By contrast, West Virginia steadfastly maintained that 
legislative reforms, such as the Funding Act of 1871, absolved West Virginia of its responsibility for 
the antebellum debt.  The two states exchanged criticisms leading up to Virginia’s October 1906 
filing of a judicial motion against West Virginia. Virginia argued that “Something had to be done in 
the way of adjusting the defaulted debt. All other efforts have failed to effect an adjustment; it was 
decided to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.”82 Pressure from investors and other states 
placed Virginia directly in harm’s way.  
West Virginians, who disagreed with Virginia’s sense of urgency, attempted to reposition the 
debate around accusations of dishonor and greed. In August 1906, West Virginia statesman James 
M. Mason, who would be elected chair of the West Virginia Debt Commission in 1913, proposed 
state congressional resolutions that suggested the Virginia debt commissioners “have brought suit 
against West Virginia for her share of the obligations, of graft.” Mr. Mason’s resolutions requested, 
“an interstate inquiry as to ‘whether said Wall Street syndicates have agreed to pay the members of 
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the [Virginia] commission large fees for their services in the matter.’”83  Mason’s accusations, while 
focused on graft and unethical behaviors, also reflected West Virginia’s interest in keeping the matter 
out of the national spotlight. West Virginians, who depended upon federal support for statehood and 
the expansion of the state after the war, now were being called into the nation’s highest federal court 
to resolve their debt disputes with citizens of another state.  
 West Virginia’s reluctance and Virginia’s subsequent Supreme Court filing reflected an 
increased dependence on the federal government for resolving political economy disputes. A series 
of Supreme Court filings between 1906 and 1918 framed the political debate between the Virginia 
and West Virginia. The debate focused on the Court’s jurisdiction to resolve the debt controversy and 
the debt itself. The first issue centered around the use of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to 
resolve the dispute.84 The decision by Virginia to submit a complaint with the Supreme Court served 
as the Commonwealth’s final option in resolving an interstate controversy as provided by the 
Constitution. In contrast, West Virginia rejected the Supreme Court’s involvement because the debt 
was a free market issue and not a constitutional matter. The second issue was the debate over the 
definition of fair and equitable proportionality. Simply put, while West Virginia constitutionally 
agreed to pay a proportion of the debt, the basis of this proportionality was never defined. Virginia 
unilaterally defined proportional allocation of the debt in terms of territory gained and lost by West 
Virginia’s secession from the Commonwealth. The final issue reflected Virginia’s and West 
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Virginia’s dispute over the nature of the Supreme Court’s decision making ability. Virginians viewed 
the Supreme Court’s review as both a logical extension of their political processes and need for 
resolution. By contrast, West Virginians focused on the consequential monetary and taxation issues 
that inherently would be resolved by the case—which reflected issues of legislative rather than 
judicial authority.  Understanding how both states and the Supreme Court addressed these issues 
reflected the strengthening of the national attitude toward debt resolution and federal intervention on 
state issues.  
Virginia’s Supreme Court filing in 1906 was set in motion by the creation of the Virginia 
Debt Commission in 1890.  The Commission consolidated the state’s negotiation capability by 
forming a political body that created terms of repayment with a Bondholders’ Committee—a body of 
investors and bondholders who demanded payment for the negotiated state bonds. The Commission 
and Bondholders’ Committee reached an agreement in 1892 that provided the Committee members 
with “$19,000 of new bonds for every $28,000 of old bonds surrendered.”85 This agreement, in 
theory, finalized Virginia’s payments to the bondholders and shifted all outstanding payments to 
West Virginia. Of the approximate $31 million in outstanding public bonds, this settlement claimed 
responsibility for over $23 million and left the remaining $8 million to be addressed through a 
compromise between the investors and West Virginia.  In response, West Virginia protested the 
continued assertions of debt responsibility. West Virginia Governor MacCorkle, in an 1893 public 
letter, declared that West Virginia was a creditor and not a debtor to Virginia. The counties that 
created West Virginia “contributed $4,000,000 and the expenditures within them by Virginia from 
1822, the date of the first issue of Virginia bonds, was over a half million less, leaving … Virginia in 
West Virginia’s debt.”86 MacCorkle’s comments reflected the sustained efforts to recast the public 
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debt as a byproduct of Virginia’s control of the Commonwealth’s political economy that predated 
both West Virginia’s rise and ability to influence state investments. MacCorkle’s facts obviously 
ignored the constitutional acknowledgement of debt incurred before January 1, 1861 and West 
Virginian’s prior debt acknowledgement.    
The Virginia Debt Commission, after a decade of failed resolutions, obtained broader state 
executive support in 1900. The Commission received Attorney General support to create more 
pressure on West Virginia. In a 1900 legislative act, Virginia acknowledged that the “Commission 
shall be authorized and empowered by and with the advice and approval of the attorney general of 
Virginia to take such action and institute such proceedings on behalf of the State as may in the 
judgment of the commission and the attorney general … to protect the interest of the state … .”87  
Virginia’s Randolph Harrison, through a declaration to the West Virginia legislature in 1901, 
implored the state’s leaders to acknowledge the dire circumstances and settle the dispute. Harrison 
declared, “The contract under which the certificates are deposited … will expire in September 1905 
unless negotiations for a settlement, or some action looking to that end, have been undertaken.”88 
Virginia’s window for a settlement was closing and it needed West Virginia’s assistance to hold off 
the investors. The Bondholders Committee was principally managed by Brown Brothers and 
Company of New York. The Committee, which represented all investors and owned nearly 85 
percent of the outstanding debt certificates, wanted to press their concern over the stalled 
negotiations.  
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 Harrison’s plea fell on deaf ears. Virginia was entrenched in a political dispute between its 
investors and its former western counterparts. By 1905, the Debt Commission and Attorney General 
decided that the State’s options were exhausted. Brown Brothers and Company threatened to sue 
both Virginia and West Virginia for payment on the outstanding certificates. In his 1905 report to the 
Virginia Governor, Attorney General William Anderson provided, “We were also informed that 
holders of the large amounts of the Virginia deferred certificates proposed to donate a portion of their 
holdings to New York … for the purpose of having an adjudication against Virginia and West 
Virginia for the liability of those States [and force payment of the bonds].” Brown Brothers and 
Company declared that it would lead a class action lawsuit against both Virginia and West Virginia 
to force a settlement. The banking firm maintained a reputation for being a thriving member of the 
New York City financial community that responded to threats with power. During the 1870s, the 
Brown Brothers participated in the takeover of New York City’s government from the corrupt Boss 
William Marcy Tweed. City officials gathered in the Brown Brothers’ offices, and “the offices of the 
Brown Brothers became City Hall. For a few weeks, the committee ruled the city. It was a municipal 
coup d’état.”89 The Brown Brothers reflected the rapid integration of private investors in the affairs 
of both contributing to and changing how government worked in the postbellum era. Virginians were 
succumbing to the economic power of New York’s financial elite that represented an influential 
social actor who forged “their firms into the most powerful institutions of nineteenth century 
America.”90  The investors represented a third party interest in settling the controversy but were also 
the most invested in a final outcome. Represented by Holmes Conrad, the investors ran out of 
patience with the states and signaled a readiness for legal action in 1905. 
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The combination of investor pressure and recent Supreme Court decisions indicated that 
Virginia’s best option for a final resolution with West Virginia was to ask the Court to resolve the 
interstate controversy. The growing bondholder unrest, when combined with the Commonwealth’s 
nearly $73 million in prior payments on the debts, prompted the Attorney General to recommend that 
the Governor file suit against West Virginia. Anderson concluded his report stating that while he was 
“exceedingly reluctant” to file a suit against West Virginia, the bondholders and creditors agreed that 
if Virginia “decree a suit against West Virginia for a settlement, they will release Virginia entirely 
from liability on account of the unfunded third of the antebellum debt.”91  The politics of interstate 
disputes and finance would again be resolved in the Supreme Court.  
Using the Supreme Court to resolve disputes over debt evolved throughout the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries through the Court’s debates over who could sue for a debt payment and how 
debt payments could be enforced. As Laura Edwards argues, “Reconstruction-era policies [took] the 
national political rhetoric of the war years and [wrote] it into the legal order of the nation. The results 
ultimately extended the federal government’s jurisdiction …which came to be seen as the guarantor 
of liberty and equality.”92 Interstate controversies continued emerging during the late-nineteenth 
century and the Supreme Court played a key role in maintaining civil conclusions over financial 
disputes. The Civil War changed the importance of the Court’s involvement. Supreme Court Justice 
Henry Brown argued, “That a court having jurisdiction of controversies between States is an absolute 
necessity in a Confederation such as ours since war is practically the only alternative. It is true the 
Constitution … provides that no State shall engage in war [with each other] but this is coupled with 
the provision that the Supreme Court should have the jurisdiction of controversies between the 
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States… .”93 Two cases in particular, the 1883 cases of New Hampshire v. Louisiana and New York 
v. Louisiana, provided a judicial review of New York’s and New Hampshire’s ability to protect the 
economic interests of state residents with claims against other states. In the New Hampshire case, 
residents held Louisiana-issued bonds and wanted state support to receive payment for the bonds. 
Citing Eleventh Amendment prohibitions against private citizens suing states, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the real question was “whether a state can allow the use of its name in such a suit for 
the benefit of one of its citizens.”94 Furthermore, the Court concluded “a state cannot create a 
controversy with another state … by assuming the prosecution of debts owed to its citizens by a sister 
state.” 95  While the Court issued rulings in favor of Louisiana, the case raised a key point about a 
state’s ability to file a bill of complaint to recover payment for debt owed by another state.  
The Supreme Court’s prolonged review of Virginia v. West Virginia traveled a circuitous 
route largely due to conflicting political perceptions over responsibility and proportionality of public 
obligations. The Supreme Court provided a venue for both states to engage in political disputes over 
resolving public debt. While each debate intersected with declarations of responsibility, loyalty, and 
political commitment, the dogged return of principal and interest payments required the parties to 
question how a debt should be paid. Virginia’s initial position was shaped through the Bill of 
Complaint filed in the Supreme Court in February 1906.  West Virginia’s positions were shaped 
through its demurrer, which rejected both Virginia’s standing and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in 
hearing the case. Finally, the Supreme Court’s positions were shaped through their use of arbitrators 
(referred to as Special Masters) and their final decisions. Virginia’s filing signaled significant 
changes in how each state should support fair and equitable responsibility for maintaining the 
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national economy. West Virginia’s reluctance to agree to this responsibility led to the Supreme Court 
providing precedent-setting decisions and concluding the case. 
Virginia’s position, established through the Bill of Complaint filed with the Supreme Court in 
October 1906, focused on the political agreements and constitutional adjustments that linked 
Congressional and Commonwealth statehood approval with West Virginia’s acknowledgement of 
paying a portion of Virginia’s public debt. Virginia’s argument, grounded in nearly 40 years of 
legislative and diplomatic attempts to resolve the issue, linked West Virginia statehood to the 
payment of a debt. Virginians cited the acknowledgement of West Virginia’s constitutional 
framework, which included a willingness to pay a portion of Virginia’s debt, as the principle defense:  
“All three—Congress, Virginia and West Virginia—had to consent to conform to Art[icle] IV, 
[Section] 3 of the U. S. Constitution. Their three respective documents, together, constituted a 
contract between the old State and the new.”96  Virginia now provided a multifaceted argument to the 
Supreme Court that linked West Virginia’s willingness to pay a fair proportion of debt in return for 
statehood.  Virginians claimed that West Virginia acquired about one-third of antebellum Virginia 
and in this process, West Virginia also assumed that fraction of the debt. This liability formed West 
Virginia’s political existence and was properly highlighted in West Virginia’s Constitution as a 
condition for statehood—however, it did not bind the state to a measure of proportionality of 
predetermined sharing of the debt. West Virginia’s repeated legislative actions over the past forty 
years reflected an acknowledgement of the debt. In addition to linking the debt with territorial 
acquisition, Virginia also highlighted the Commonwealth’s transfer of real property to West Virginia 
to create a settlement. The final component of Virginia’s bill was an acknowledgement of which 
people actually created West Virginia. Even though it was an action of the Restored Government of 
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Virginia that led to the formation of West Virginia, the Restored Government was only made up of 
people interested in creating West Virginia.97 Virginia focused on forcing West Virginia and the 
Supreme Court to acknowledge that West Virginia independently created a contract with two 
possible outcomes: accept a portion of the debt as the price for independence or deny the debt and 
reject the contract that led to statehood.  
Virginia argued that the Commonwealth’s citizenry endured their fair share of economic pain 
due to the questionable creation of West Virginia as a state. After the Civil War ended, Virginia 
made several attempts either to rejoin with West Virginia or reclaim portions of the new state. West 
Virginia rebuffed these efforts with claims that Virginia only delayed West Virginia in achieving its 
full promise as a state in the Union and the interest in rejoining were veiled attempts to replenish an 
exhausted treasury. Virginia responded to these rebuffs and focused on restoring the 
Commonwealth’s political economy and struggling through postbellum economic pain and suffering. 
Attorney General William Anderson focused the Court’s attention on the timing of the Funding Act 
of 1871 and Virginia’s fragile state of affairs. Anderson argued, “Your honors will observe that by 
that statute the Commonwealth of Virginia, then just emerging from the war, with her fields 
devastated and many of her homes in ashes … actually assumed not only two-thirds of the principal 
of the original debt, but assumed two-thirds of all the interest which had accrued upon it during the 
war interest … .” This amount reflected a burden that far exceeded the public debt that existed prior 
to January 1, 1861.98  Virginia’s Funding Act of 1871 was not merely completed to force West 
Virginia into paying a debt. The statute attempted to keep Virginia from defaulting on its obligations.  
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Virginia’s counsel understood that if West Virginia wanted to explore matters of fairness and 
legitimacy, Virginia would raise issue with how West Virginia became a state in the first place. 
Counsel for the Bondholders, Holmes Conrad,  poetically responded, “A child born through a 
Cesarean operation is as valid as one that comes into the world in the usual and ordinary way. As to 
West Virginia’s genesis, and the legitimacy of her birth, you perhaps had better—‘Make no deep 
scrutiny/Into her Mutiny/Rash and undutiful.’”99 Virginia’s combined efforts—of resolving its own 
debt and tolerating the federal government’s processes for accepting West Virginia into the Union—
now became the Commonwealth’s strongest points for forcing West Virginia into a settlement for 
payment. By contrast, West disagreed with the entire case.  
West Virginia responded to Virginia’s Bill of Complaint with a demurrer rejecting both 
Virginia’s legal standing in the case and the use of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the case. West Virginia asserted that there was no controversy between the states because 
the burden of payment now resided with the investors and certificate holders. This was a dispute that 
required free market intervention and commercial savviness and not a Constitutional dispute.  The 
demurrer specified that there was no controversy between the states because “Virginia has been 
released from the payment of one-third of her debt contracted before the formation of West Virginia” 
and therefore, it is the certificate holders rather than Virginia that has an interest in resolving the debt 
issue.100 Through Virginia’s multiple legislative reforms and the transfer of the certificates and bonds 
into the names of bondholders, did not give the Commonwealth “any right to maintain the suit in her 
name.”101 This was a dispute between a state (West Virginia) and a banking firm (Brown Brothers 
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and Company) over a matter of money. West Virginia was contending that since this was not an 
interstate controversy, the Supreme Court held no jurisdiction to resolve the case. 
West Virginia, which depended upon federal intervention to achieve independence and 
statehood, now offered a demurrer against the federal government intervening on Virginia’s behalf. 
This was not a dismissal of the Court’s original jurisdiction. Instead, West Virginia argued that the 
dispute was not a constitutionally defined controversy. The state’s argument was that Virginia’s 
antebellum debt was resolved through its funding acts and the responsibility was transferred to the 
certificate holders. West Virginians declared that “The purpose of this suit is to settle the liability of 
West Virginia on these deferred certificates to the owners … and any decree which is rendered in this 
case must relate solely to their rights. The court cannot enter any decree who are not before the Court 
either as plaintiffs or defendants.”102  The risk and the issue was a matter of cash payments 
demanded by private investors.  West Virginia claimed that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction 
could not be used because the dispute was reserved to States to resolve.  West Virginia ignored its 
prior acknowledgement to pay a portion of Virginia’s debt as no longer relevant. The 
Commonwealth’s funding acts erased the antebellum debt and any remaining debt was now owned 
by private investors. The demurrer asserted that “we perceive that as to this feature of the bill now 
under consideration, the court has no jurisdiction in any aspect of the case, nor can any amendment 
be made so as to give this court jurisdiction.”103 West Virginia could only resolve the issue with 
Virginia—not the creditors.  The controversy between West Virginia and the bondholders did not 
constitutionally justify the Supreme Court’s review because there was no interstate controversy. 
West Virginia also contended that the public debt issue was not the deciding factor for 
statehood; instead, it was West Virginia’s position on slavery and the investments West Virginia 
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made to establish a government. West Virginia’s Charles Hogg, a prominent statesman, agreed that 
constitutional agreements among West Virginia, Virginia, and the United States were key to West 
Virginia achieving statehood. However, the constitutional acknowledgement for paying a proportion 
of Virginia’s debt occurred prior to the final approval of statehood. Hogg insisted that West Virginia 
statehood was approved when the new state approved a proviso “That slavery shall be excluded from 
its boundaries. And when that was done, proclamation thereof should be made, and thereafter the 
proposed new state should be admitted into the Union.”104 The constitutional acknowledgement for 
paying a proportion of Virginia’s debt was less significant to the statehood vote than the amendment 
limiting slavery. Furthermore, West Virginia pointed to its investments and debts that made early 
statehood a fiscally challenging period for them as well. West Virginia argued that, while Virginia 
endured postbellum expenses and hardships, West Virginia experienced its own form of financial 
struggle prior to becoming a state. The demurrer stated that, “when [Virginia]  parted … the territory 
she parted with had to be erected into a state government, all the institutions necessary to its 
operation to be constructed, and great expense incurred [to achieve] the status of an independent 
state.”105 West Virginia and Virginia were not in a battle of equity that required the Supreme Court’s 
attention. This was a matter of two states and investors debating a “simple money demand, because it 
was without power to make it effective.”106 West Virginia claimed only that the state legislature 
could settle the debt, as the only expected solution to this problem was either a state-funded taxation 
or public bond program to generate the necessary revenue to pay down any debt.107 Under the 
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current circumstances, West Virginians proposed ending the case and allowing the states to work 
toward a settlement through legislative means.  
The Supreme Court disagreed in relatively short order with West Virginia’s demurrer and 
elected to proceed with the review of the case. Chief Justice Melville Fuller warned West Virginia 
not to question the enforcement capability of the Court. He provided a lengthy array of precedents 
that defined controversies and in the process, confirmed the existence of an interstate controversy 
between Virginia and West Virginia. The Court’s response and dismissal of West Virginia’s 
demurrer foreshadowed West Virginia’s steadfast reluctance to engage fully in the judicial processes. 
Fuller reminded West Virginia’s counsel and representatives that, “‘if the state should repudiate the 
decree or judgement, the Court would then consider means by which it might be enforced, that 
consent to be sued was given when West Virginia was admitted the Union’.”108 The Court turned its 
attention toward the merits of Virginia’s suit. The principal matter evolved into a question of fair and 
equitable allocation of the debt. 
Virginia established its position on the matter of debt proportionality as early as 1871 and 
remained entrenched in the opinion that West Virginia owed one-third of the debt. Through 
Virginia’s Funding Bill of 1871, the Commonwealth relied upon the size of the two partitioned states 
before the war to allocate one-third of the debt to West Virginia.  Virginians believed that the debt 
should be reduced in proportion to the “impairment of the security on which [the debt] had been 
based—one third for the loss of West Virginia and one-third for the property destroyed by the war 
…” served as a clear benchmark for determining responsibility.109 Virginia’s approach ignored the 
Commonwealth’s decisions to depart from the Union rather than force West Virginia to leave. Before 
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the war, eastern Virginians accepted responsibility for secession in order to maintain “her 
agricultural, her manufacturing, and her shipping interests.”110 These efforts failed and now 
Virginians wanted to minimize the significant risks they had cultivated throughout the 1860s. The act 
authorized “interest-bearing coupons, instead of bonds, were to be issued for one-third of the debt, 
for which ‘payment … will be provided in accordance with such settlements between … Virginia 
and West Virginia.’”111 Virginia repeated this similar course of legislative action throughout the 
remainder of the nineteenth century. The Virginia General Assembly enacted funding legislative 
relating to the debt in 1871, 1879, 1882, and 1892. Virginia’s assembly encouraged bondholders to 
trade in existing bonds for certificates redeemable after a settlement between West Virginia and 
Virginia. The burden of payment to the bondholders remained the responsibility of Virginia from 
1871 until 1892—when the Virginia Debt Commission renegotiated terms of the bonds and 
unfunded certificates. Virginia could not afford to accept full responsibility for repayment and 
proposed a funding measure that intentionally fell short.  The one-third measurement reflected a fair 
and equitable proportionality based on the distribution of territory. West Virginia disagreed.  
The question of proportionality, although addressed by West Virginians in the initial 
Wheeling Convention ordinances, remained a central issue that required consensual agreement. West 
Virginian leaders rejected Virginia’s postbellum legislative maneuvers that defined the level of West 
Virginia proportionality as one-third of the debt. The undefined term “proportion” provided West 
Virginia lawmakers with options. West Virginian representative J.M. Mason of Charleston 
distributed a pamphlet summarizing the debt controversy and provided options of how 
proportionality could be defined between the parties in 1884. Mason recommended: “Size of the two 
sections”—if so, West Virginia owed one-third of the debt; “relative populations”—if so, West 
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Virginia owed one-seventh; “relative amount of taxable property”—if so, West Virginia would be 
“light before 1830 and heavy after 1850”; “[total] expended on … executive, legislative, judicial , 
fiscal, and police”—if so, West Virginia would be heavy; “amount of revenue contributed” if so, the 
amount would be little before 1820 and a significant amount after 1850.112 Until the states could 
define proportionality, the debt issue would persist. However, another key aspect of Virginia’s 
assertion that bondholders would be paid after settlement between the two states was that West 
Virginia believed settlement should be between West Virginia and the bondholders and not with 
Virginia. The bondholders were subjected to loss and West Virginia, while unable to pay off 100 
percent of the outstanding debt, could settle separately with the bondholders. The certificates only 
complicated the issue of repayment. West Virginians confidently believed that because Virginia did 
not have the authority to allocate debt responsibility unilaterally and that the debt certificates blurred 
the lines of who was still owed funds, the Supreme Court would support West Virginia’s claims.  
  While the Supreme Court evaluated the accounting treatment of the debt and asserted the 
Court’s power to resolve the matter, the Justices largely spoke to the issue of proportionality in their 
decision. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes issued the Court’s majority opinion in April 1911 and he 
spoke to West Virginia’s delays and requirements to be accountable. Holmes clarified that West 
Virginia’s wartime constitutional acknowledgements of paying the debt remained intact even if there 
was a delay in creating an agreement with Virginia or West Virginia’s own Constitutional changes 
after the war ended. Holmes argued that the constitutional and legislative steps towards statehood 
were the basis for an agreement among the United States Congress, Virginia, and West Virginia. The 
Court would not refute the agreements that created West Virginia as a state.  Instead, he asserted that 
the one issue that should be decided by the Court was the matter of proportionality. Holmes stated 
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that the debt proportionality “is a judicial question” that the Court can decide.113  West Virginia 
benefitted from and contributed to the Commonwealth’s decisions before the Civil War and the new 
state should be held accountable for a part of the outstanding debt. The Supreme Court determined a 
ratio based on “the estimated valuation of the real and personal property of the two states on the date 
of the separation. It seems plain that slaves as property should be excluded from this valuation.” 
Based on the amount of valued property that switched hands provided the most firm basis for 
determining West Virginia’s proportion. West Virginia’s fair proportion of the debt, which Virginia 
placed at 33 percent (one-third) of the antebellum debt, was now 23.5 percent of a total balance of 
$30,563,861. West Virginia was responsible for $7,182,507.114 The Supreme Court’s decision 
provided a resolution but not a conclusion to the dispute between Virginia and West Virginia.  
The question of the debt’s interest remained an outstanding question for both parties. Justice 
Holmes, in his closing remarks, attempted to encourage both parties to rise above their sectional 
interests through a commitment to the national good—which was a hallmark of Holmes’s postbellum 
reconciliation efforts throughout the late-nineteenth century. After the war, the former Union leader 
argued that the sense of devotion and commitment to a cause that led northerners and southerners to 
fight against one another should now be relied upon to support national glory.115 Holmes used 
similar sentiments in the Court’s Opinion by declaring that “Great States have a temper superior to 
that of private litigants, and it is to be hoped that enough has been decided for patriotism, the 
fraternity of the Union, and mutual consideration to bring it to an end.”116  Holmes’s optimism did 
not lead to a timely result. The court would continue to push both states towards a final resolution 
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that would not be obtained until 1919. West Virginia remained reluctant to accept the federal 
government’s intervention into their ability to resolve their own disputes. 
The question of enforcement reflected the final issue for the Supreme Court to decide 
between Virginia and West Virginia. The Supreme Court’s decisions reflected opinions on 
judgement and application of the law. As the highest law in the land, the Court’s decisions reflected 
the final position on a matter. However, in suits of equity between states, the Court traditionally 
stopped short of demanding that a state pay another state. In the 1904 case of South Dakota v. North 
Carolina, South Dakotan bondholders transferred bonds to the state to force North Carolina into 
paying a portion of the bonds.117 Similar to the Virginia vs. West Virginia suit, North Carolina argued 
that the Court did not have jurisdiction to settle the case and could not implement a decision to force 
North Carolina to pay. The Court debated if a decree could be issued that mandated the North 
Carolina legislature pass a tax program to satisfy the debts—which they decided it could not; 
however, the Court did authorize “the marshal of the Court ‘to sell at public auction all the interest of 
the public stock … of the North Carolina Railroad Company.” This amounted to about $27,400 in 
payment to South Dakota.118 West Virginia focused on the Court’s precedent for advising against 
forcing a state pay another state. West Virginia’s unwillingness to work toward a joint resolution, as 
foreshadowed by Chief Justice Fuller, led the Supreme Court to mandate a resolution to be executed 
by both parties. 
Following the Holmes decision, both parties followed a process that mirrored the previous 
ten years: Virginia doggedly attempted to resolve the debt dispute and West Virginia continued to 
protest the viability of the debt or the Court’s ability to dictate the terms of any agreement. The 
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Holmes decision determined the amount of debt principal that West Virginia owed to Virginia but 
the Court left the matter of the debt’s interest to the states to decide. Virginia’s Debt Commission 
made several unsuccessful attempts with both the Supreme Court and West Virginia to expedite an 
agreement of a fair interest rate on the $7 million that West Virginia was asked to pay by the Court. 
Virginia Attorney General, Samuel Williams, reported to the Virginia governor in 1912 that “The 
United States Supreme Court having refused to speed the cause until the meeting of the West 
Virginia legislature … nothing has been done in the case since [the Court’s final decision].”119  
Virginia and West Virginia representatives met in 1913 to debate the issue of interest. West 
Virginia’s interpretations of the Court’s decision as a suggestion of debt resolution rather than a 
decree of execution continued to draw out the debt controversy. 
West Virginia finally created its own debt commission to confer with the Virginia Debt 
Commission in Washington, D.C. to resolve the debt issue in 1913. While Virginians entered the 
discussion presuming that the central topic would be the development and agreement on an interest 
rate, West Virginians wanted to review the entire case.120 West Virginia’s Debt Commission 
chairman, John Mason, contended that West Virginia did not see the Supreme Court’s decision as a 
decree but rather as a suggestion: “We do not consider at all that the Supreme Court has settled the 
amount. It has indicated a basis. It took a different one from yours or ours, either one. You suggested 
[proportional distribution based] upon the basis of population, and ours was upon taking the 
Wheeling ordinance. They said both [rationales] were wrong, and in their report took the taxable 
values.”121 Furthermore, West Virginia viewed the conference as “a matter of compromise between 
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the two commissions. We do not want to meet as if still carrying on a lawsuit.”122  West Virginia 
attempted to reestablish the dispute as a regional conflict that did not require federal intervention and 
the national courts to drive toward resolution. West Virginia’s efforts reflected the state’s persistent 
perspective that the only acceptable solution was one that was created by and enforced through the 
state’s legislative processes. Virginia disagreed and once again, returned to the Supreme Court for 
support.  
 The Supreme Court provided West Virginia with additional time to craft a settlement and 
again, West Virginia delayed in resolving the case. In the October 1913 term, the Supreme Court 
decided that, “Having regard to these representations, we think we ought not to grant [Virginia’s] 
motion to proceed at once to consider and determine the cause, but should … comply with the 
request made for further time to enable the Commissioners of West Virginia to complete the work 
for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the controversy.”123  With the additional time, West 
Virginia constructed a new settlement offer for Virginia’s consideration. Based on West Virginia’s 
arguments that the state was not compensated for a share of Virginia’s profits of certain stocks, bonds 
and property, the actual debt should be $2.3 million.124 Virginia objected to the proposal. The 
Supreme Court’s 1911 decision defined the debt principal and the only remaining matter was the 
interest. The Commonwealth’s legal team motioned the Court to enforce its decree and demand that 
West Virginia resolve the issue of interest rates. The Supreme Court, once again, brought in an 
independent arbiter who assessed 60 years of financial transactions and recommended terms of 
principal and interest payment that would resolve the debt controversy.   
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The Supreme Court made its final decision in 1915 and this time, West Virginia was 
provided with no additional latitude to refute the decisions. The court decreed that West Virginia’s 
total obligation, with principal and interest combined, was $12,393,929.50. West Virginia continued 
to delay acceptance of this decision and insisted the state legislature was the only body that could 
create and execute a decree to fund the debt.  The Supreme Court’s decisions were mere suggestions. 
After several more years of West Virginia declaring that the Supreme Court could not enforce its 
decision, the Supreme Court finally directed West Virginia to accept the final decree and pay 
Virginia. In 1918, the Supreme Court explained to West Virginia’s representatives that “The court 
held it possessed the authority to enforce a decree by appropriate proceedings against a state [and] 
Congress possesses [the authority] to control agreements between states.” Furthermore, the Court 
acknowledged that they were not going to close the case and “reserved the right, if necessary, to 
appoint a special master to examine and prepare” the methods for taxation and enforcing the 
judgment. West Virginia’s legislature increased taxes and created a public bond program to pay back 
the debt. Chief Justice Edward White, attempting to avoid any additional obstacles, deemed that the 
Court reserved the right to “appoint a master for the purpose of examining and reporting concerning 
the amount and method of taxation to be put into effect… .”125 Simply put, the Supreme Court 
asserted federal authority over West Virginia and mandated compliance.126  West Virginia’s 
acquiescence was created through legislative reform and the Virginia Debt Controversy was 
resolved.  
The Supreme Court’s decision restored Virginia’s reputation and was hailed as a victory for 
the banking industry and private investors who waited decades to reap the gains of their investments.  
Philadelphia’s Evening Public Ledger declared, “After a long series of years, during which [the case] 
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dragged through the courts, the famous West Virginia debt case has at last been settled, thanks to the 
persistence of Brown Brothers & Co.” West Virginia’s state legislature, on April 1, 1919, enacted 
legislation that provided the final solution to the debt controversy. The West Virginia Treasurer drew 
a check “out of any funds available … and deliver [a] check to the Commonwealth of Virginia” that 
reflected a credit to Virginia for the outstanding interest that had accrued since the Supreme Court’s 
1915 decision.127 West Virginia’s Treasurer issued a cash payment of $1,078,662—the single largest 
interstate cash payment.  Furthermore, West Virginia would issue $12,366,500 in coupon bonds. The 
coupon bonds were twenty year gold bonds that 3 ½ percent interest that would be distributed “over a 
period of 20 years, beginning with the date of the bond and ending with maturity.” Finally, West 
Virginia created $1,133,500 in reserve bonds. The reserve bonds would be issued in payment for any 
outstanding Virginia Deferred Certificates which “may have been lost or destroyed [and] not certified 
as deposited with the Commonwealth of Virginia … .”128 This financial resolution provided Virginia 
with a comprehensive resolution to the long standing challenge. In 1919, Virginia Auditor Rosewell 
Page argued concluded the analysis of the controversy by contending Virginia “removed from her 
good name the imputation of being a repudiator.”129 
The Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of Virginia’s position—that West Virginia did owe 
a portion of the debt—reflected an important change to the political memory of West Virginia’s 
addition to the Union. When West Virginia joined the Union in 1863, President Lincoln “attached 
greater importance to recognizing the claims of loyal people of West Virginia than concerns about 
future difficulties in restoring secessionist Virginia to the Union. Moreover, [admitting West Virginia 
helped in] reconciling many western leaders to the Emancipation Proclamation.”130 West Virginia no 
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longer carried the same political weight that it did during the war. The Court’s acceptance of 
Virginia’s arguments reflected a continuation of cases adjudicated in the 1870s and 1880s that 
severely circumscribed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments and returned power to the states at 
the expense of the federal government. Furthermore, this case reflected a continued amelioration of 
relations with southern states at the expense of West Virginians who had used territorial acquisition 
and the transfer of real property as a means of supporting the Union; the Supreme Court now viewed 
the same factors as the basis for Virginia to be repaid. The public debt settlement highlighted 
Virginia’s continued emergence as a center of political and economic reform and West Virginia’s 
continued battle to meet wartime expectations and overcome their colonial dependence. 
West Virginia’s final acknowledgement reflected the opportunity cost for its prior dependent 
relationships on Virginia and the Federal government. After the Civil War, West Virginia’s economy 
did not produce the financial gains that either Virginia or the federal government envisioned in the 
nineteenth century. West Virginia’s shift from relying upon the federal government to asserting its 
own sovereign control to reconcile the debt reflected a regression in the state’s political processes. 
Changes created through the Civil War and Reconstruction era shifted political dependence from the 
regional level to the national level. However, West Virginia’s political reforms of the late-nineteenth 
century underscored West Virginia’s continued subordinate status. The Supreme Court’s decision 
comprised West Virginia’s efforts to both declare and maintain independence. Interstate commerce 
complicated financial exchanges and state governments could no longer be the sole mediator in 
resolving financial disputes. The administration of financial failure and fiscal obligations evolved 
into a nationalized political issue by the early twentieth century. West Virginia’s judicial arguments 
for states’ rights conflicted with the nation’s trend for developing uniform treatment of the debtor and 
creditor relationships that now served as the basis for the political economy.  
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Conclusion: A Fair and Equitable Proportion 
 
West Virginia settled its debt, and the negative impacts of that settlement became 
apparent.  Throughout the 1920s, reminders of the defeat and examples of Virginia’s return to 
power provided West Virginia with ample frustration. With West Virginia’s tax rates increasing 
in order to sustain the terms of the debt settlement, Virginia continued to benefit from a warm 
relationship with the Federal Government. The New York Herald, in April 1921, headlined, 
“Amiable Debt Settlements: Virginia and the Federal Government Friendly Over Century Old 
Claims.” Virginia identified unfunded claims, such as Virginia’s contribution to federal spending 
during the Mexican War, that were peacefully resolved between the federal and state 
authorities.131  By contrast, West Virginia continued subsidizing Virginia’s projects and growth. 
The Richmond Times-Dispatch reported in April 1922 that a Virginia building “cannot cost more 
than $750,000. In order to obtain the necessary money, [the Brewer Bill] authorizes the 
Governor to dispose of the bonds of the State of West Virginia received by the State as part of its 
shares of the proceeds of the Virginia-West Virginia debt settlement.”132 West Virginia’s 
political philosophy of creating a new state grounded in fairness and equality was not realized in 
the manner that Carlisle and Willey planned.  
West Virginia’s involvement in the Supreme Court case highlighted a shift in the state’s 
political economy, which occurred throughout the nineteenth century. The term “equitable 
proportion” of the public debt became a matter of legend for West Virginia. Each political 
generation attempted to reconcile why the public debt was acknowledged and what the debt 
represented. During the nineteenth century, states controlled their political economies and 
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administered their interactions with “political outsiders.” West Virginia’s settlement with the 
Supreme Court reflected an important transition in public debt resolution processes.  While debt 
provided opportunities for independence from Virginia, it also led to dependency on the federal 
government. During West Virginia’s constitutional convention of 1862, Waitman Willey 
recognized the political value of claiming a portion of a debt rather than waiting for a superior 
authority (Virginia or the federal government) to impose a debt. Willey counseled his fellow 
West Virginians that assuming a just and equitable proportion of the Virginia debt “is eminently 
right and proper. What will [the debt] be when the war is terminated? Give us a new state [of 
West Virginia], and our existing rates of taxes will be lessened. Remain as we are, and they must 
necessarily be increased more than tenfold.”133 Constitutionally acknowledging a portion of the 
debt reflected confidence in West Virginia’s actions and ability to navigate the politically 
tumultuous waters of the 1860s. By contrast, West Virginia’s inability to settle the debt issue in 
the twentieth century reflected West Virginia’s protracted sense of political inferiority that was at 
the core of the state’s economy.   
 Despite 40 years of “independence” from 1860 to 1900, West Virginia’s political 
economy was postcolonial in nature. Inferior and dependent, West Virginia’s failed 
reconciliation over the public debt issue framed the century-long transition of the state’s political 
economy. State leaders sought a political economy in which taxes and political representation—
and the public debt—would be based on a fair and proportional basis. Antebellum West 
Virginians tried to create and manage their own debt as a means of liberating themselves from 
Virginia’s eastern powers. State delegates agreed to fund a fair and equitable proportion of 
Virginia’s debt as an expression of West Virginia’s control and power to set the terms of 
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negotiation with eastern Virginians. However, these political concessions merely transferred 
their dependence to the Union government and the northern investors who continued to control 
West Virginia interests from a distance. This process reinforced the establishment of a 
postcolonial political economy that remained both inferior and dependent on outside entities for 
political power.    
The prevalence of outsiders both to create and extract value from West Virginia occurred 
throughout the nineteenth century and typified the state’s political economy. Historian John 
Williams summarized West Virginia’s shortcomings of the early twentieth century: “The 
creation of a new and unformed polity in a territory almost wholly subject to the social impact of 
extractive industry resulted in a phenomenon described as a colonial political economy.”134  
West Virginia’s extended history of dependence did not end in the 1860s and more importantly, 
the Supreme Court’s decision indicated that the political economy was firmly in a state of 
postcolonial dependence. Revolutionary Era historian Kariann Yokota argued that “The 
experience of being judged by the standards of a distant metropole as inferior and uncivilized 
informed a wide variety of social practices.”135 Nineteenth-century West Virginia struggled to 
become an independent political entity. Yokota’s illustration of the British “refusal to recognize 
the right of the U.S. government to define the terms with which they conferred citizenship” 
served as a parallel example to the Supreme Court’s later refusal to allow West Virginia to define 
the terms of interstate negotiations.136 Fundamentally, West Virginia’s inability to resolve the 
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public debt issues contributed to the development of a postcolonial political economy throughout 
the nineteenth century and early twentieth century.   
West Virginians fundamentally maintained a political economy that traded in one 
overlord (eastern Virginians) for another (Northerners) who wanted West Virginia to become a 
proxy for their interests. Anthropologist David Graeber argued that debts were created through 
exchanges fluctuating between equality and separation: “Debt is what happens in between [the 
exchange and the repayment]: when the two parties cannot yet walk away from each other, 
because they are not equal.”137  Simply put, debt placed West Virginia in a dependent condition 
to other political authorities that limited its political authority and solvency. A struggle for 
equality and the ability to influence the Commonwealth’s political direction and the Supreme 
Court’s decision was stymied by unaddressed public debts throughout the nineteenth century.   
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